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Note
Gasperini v. Center For Humanities, Inc:,
State Jury Award Controls Supplant
Seventh Amendment Protections
In the trial by jury, the right to which is secured by the 7th
Amendment, both the court and the jury are essential factors. To
the former is committed the power of direction and superinten-
dence and to the latter the ultimate determination of the issues of
fact. Only through the co-operation of the two, each acting within
its appropriate sphere, can the constitutional right be satisfied.
And so, to dispense with either, or to permit one to disregard the
province of the other, is to impinge on that right.2
I. Introduction
In reviewing new trial motions on grounds of verdict exces-
siveness, should a federal court, sitting in diversity, apply a
state or federal law standard of review? Whether such a motion
is granted or denied, are federal courts of appeals barred from
reviewing a district court decision by the Seventh Amendment's
Re-examination Clause?
The Supreme Court has treated the Seventh Amendment
as a compilation of two independent clauses, both of which pre-
serve a separate and distinct right.3 Together, the Amendment
regulates the duties of and limitations upon both judge and jury
within the federal court system.4 However, the two clauses are
1. 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996).
2. Slocum v. N.Y. Life Insurance Co., 228 U.S. 364, 382 (1913).
3. See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-48 (1830). See also The
Justices v. Murray, 76 U.S. (1 Wall.) 273, 277 (1870)
4. See Edmonson v. Leesvelle Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 624-625 (1991);
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485-88 (1935).
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not "to be construed together," nor are they to be "regarded as
inseparable."5
It is the contemporary abandonment of the second clause of
the Seventh Amendment that is the focus of this article. The
second clause states, "no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise
re-examined in any Court of the United States, [other] than ac-
cording to the rules of the common law."6 This clause has been
referred to as the Re-examination Clause.7 Behind the adoption
of the Re-examination Clause is a "studied purpose" to protect
the right to a jury trial from future impairments resulting from
attempts to enlarge re-examination power.8
The background section of this article will begin in Part II
by tracing the development of the Erie doctrine.9 The Supreme
Court's traditional determination of whether federal or state
law should supply the standard to review jury findings will also
be addressed in Part II. Part III of the background will focus on
the Seventh Amendment's prohibition on federal appellate
court review of factual issues determined by a jury. Since the
parameters of the prohibition are derived from the structure of
English common law, the status of jury verdict review at the
time of the adoption of the Seventh Amendment in the English
judiciary system will be examined. Part III will close with a
focus on the Supreme Court's traditional interpretation of the
second clause of the Seventh Amendment and its more recent
treatment by the courts of appeals. Thereafter, Part IV will
trace the factual background and procedural history of the note
case, Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,1° together with
an outline of the Supreme Court's opinion and both Justice Ste-
vens' and Justice Scalia's dissents.
The analysis section will examine the inapplicability of
state law review standards to the review of federal trial rulings
on new trial motions for jury verdict excessiveness. It shall be
shown that the Court conducted an incomplete Erie analysis,
5. The Justices, 76 U.S. at 277.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The first clause of the Seventh Amendment reads
"[in [s]uits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." Id.
7. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2211, 2222 (1996).
8. Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935).
9. See infra Part II.
10. 116 S. Ct. 2211.
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thus arriving at the erroneous conclusion that New York's Civil
Practice Law and Rules 5501(c)" standard should be applied in
federal court. Additionally, since the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure address the matter of granting new trials on grounds of
verdict excessiveness, there should be no question that federal
as opposed to state law should control. The second part of the
analysis section will address the traditional interpretation of
the second clause of the Seventh Amendment as a ban on fed-
eral appellate review of trial court decisions on new trial mo-
tions for excessiveness. Thereafter, the more recent deviation
by the courts of appeals from this prohibitory history will be
explored. It will be shown that the Supreme Court responded to
this deviation by departing from tradition and validating this
type of appellate review, notwithstanding a heated dissent from
Justice Scalia. As a result, the Supreme Court indirectly dele-
gated to the courts of appeals the responsibility of interpreting
the Constitution. In the end, the status of the second clause of
the Seventh Amendment was drastically downgraded.
II. Choice of Law: Erie Doctrine and the Designation of
State or Federal Law
A. The Rules of Decision Act and the Rules Enabling Act
The Rules of Decision Act, § 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
requires that when federal courts preside over state actions,
"[tihe laws of the several states, except where the Constitution
. . of the United States or the Acts of Congress otherwise re-
quire or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil
actions."12 One such limitation on the application of state law
in federal courts is embodied in the Rules Enabling Act.' 3 The
Rules Enabling Act statutorily delegates to the Supreme Court,
when directing federal courts, the authority to "prescribe, by
general rules of practice and procedure . . . for cases in the
United States district courts ... and courts of appeals." 4 Pur-
suant to such authority, the Supreme Court adopted the Fed-
11. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1995).
13. See Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1987) (citing
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965)).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
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eral Rules of Civil Procedure which define the structure and
procedure of the federal court system.15 However, the Supreme
Court was precluded from formulating rules that would
"abridge, enlarge, [or] modify the substantive rights" of any liti-
gant.16 A particular rule is encompassed within the scope of au-
thority granted by the Rules Enabling Act and thus is
constitutional if the issue addressed by the rule in question gen-
uinely centers on procedure. 17 In the event that it is determined
that a given rule under examination can be characterized as
"indisputably procedural," that rule will be found to be
constitutional.1s
B. Choice of Law: The Application of the Erie Doctrine
1. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins1 9
The Erie doctrine was first articulated in a negligence case
filed by a Pennsylvania citizen in New York Southern District
Court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction, 20 against a railroad in-
corporated in New York, for injuries inflicted in Pennsylvania.2'
Interpreting the Rules of Decision Act, the Court held that
state substantive law should be applied in federal diversity ac-
tions. 22 Further, such applicable state law was to be derived
from either state statutory or common law.23 In so ruling, the
Court declared that there was "no federal general common
law."24 Further, the Court continued, Congress lacked constitu-
tional authority to craft "substantive rules of common law"
which could be applied to state-created actions. 25
15. See Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 433 n.5 (1956).
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
17. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1941). To determine
if a matter relates to procedure, one must ask if the matter addresses "the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them." Id. at 14.
18. Burlington, 480 U.S. at 5.
19. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Section 1332 states "[tihe district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $50,000 ... and is between ... citizens of different [sitates." Id.
21. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 69.
22. See id. at 78.
23. See id.
24. Id.
25. See id.
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Therefore, Erie announced the legal principle that federal
courts, sitting in diversity jurisdiction over state claims, must
apply state substantive law.26 The application of state law was
necessary to avoid discrimination against a state citizen. 27 If
state law was not applied, non-citizens, with the option of
choosing the court in which to bring their action, could choose
the law that would put them at an advantage and their oppo-
nent at a disadvantage. 28 The potential for disparate treatment
between courts increased the possibility of forum-shopping. 29
Although the Court fashioned a solution to eliminate the risk of
forum-shopping whereby state substantive law was to be ap-
plied by the federal court, 30 it failed to elucidate a clear analysis
to be employed by lower federal courts in determining which
issues were in fact substantive. The Court did, however, state
that "matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts
of Congress" were explicitly exempt from being characterized as
substantive.31
2. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 32
Guaranty Trust addressed the issue of whether a statute of
limitations was substantive law.33 More specifically, the issue
was whether a state's statute of limitations should be applied in
a federal court, sitting in diversity jurisdiction, even though the
federal statute of limitations was longer.34 First, Justice Frank-
furter stated that an abstract characterization of particular ele-
ments of law as procedural or substantive was irrelevant to the
issue of choice of law.35 However, what was vital to the correct
analysis was the understanding that a plaintiffs "right to re-
cover," when suing on a state-created action in a federal court,
stemmed from state law.36 Accordingly, if a state court would
bar recovery, a federal court was barred from providing a forum
26. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 64.
27. See id. at 75-77.
28. See id. at 74-75.
29. See id. at 75.
30. See id.
31. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
32. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
33. See id.
34. See id. at 107.
35. See id. at 109.
36. See id. at 108-09.
1997] 203
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for recovery in that action.37 In so determining, the Court de-
clared that the necessary inquiry to pose in ruling on whether
state law applies in federal court was not whether the particu-
lar state law concerned the "manner and means by which a
right to recover ... is enforced." 38 Rather, a state law will be
characterized as a "matter of substance," and will be applied in
federal court, if the application of the particular state law "sig-
nificantly affect[s] the result of a litigation."39
The application of the state statute of limitations, instead
of the federal statute of limitations, in Guaranty Trust would
have had a significant effect on the action and would have acted
as a total bar to recovery.40 That is, the federal statute of limi-
tations would have given life to a cause of action which was
dead under state law.41 Focusing on the effect state law had on
the outcome of the litigation, the Court ruled that the state stat-
ute of limitations should apply.42 The analysis engaged in by
the Guaranty Trust Court would later be referred to as the "out-
come-determinative" test.43
3. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc44
Following Guaranty Trust, some judicial commentators
voiced the belief that the Court's expansive "outcome-determi-
native" test would undoubtedly engulf nearly every federal law
of procedure. 45 However, Byrd signaled a modification of the
Guaranty Trust interpretation of Erie which partially redi-
rected the legal analysis on the choice of law question.46 In
Byrd, defendant, Blue Ridge, raised an affirmative defense
under South Carolina law that the plaintiff, as a statutory em-
ployee of Byrd, was limited to workers' compensation and thus
barred from tort recovery.47 The issue before the Court was
37. See Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 110.
38. Id. at 109.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 107.
41. See id. at 107, 109.
42. See Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 110.
43. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
44. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
45. See 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4504 (2d ed. 1996).
46. See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 525.
47. See id. at 526-28.
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whether a South Carolina Supreme Court decision, 48 which as-
signed to the judge the factual determination of defining a per-
son as a statutory employee, should be applied in federal court
despite the federal policy, which required that all factual deter-
minations be made by a jury.49
Interpreting the holding of Erie, the Byrd Court found that
Erie required federal courts to conform to state law when such
law substantially affected the outcome of the case in a manner
that would result in a divergence between federal and state
court holdings.50 Applying this Erie interpretation to the in-
stant case, the Court admitted that such a divergent outcome
could, on the facts, be possible. 51 However, Byrd declared that
the possibility of divergent results could not be exclusively con-
sidered when competing federal considerations exist.52 The fact
that a particular state law had a substantial impact on the out-
come of a litigation was not dispositive of its application. 53
State law cannot be allowed to disrupt an essential function or
the overall character of the federal judiciary.5 4 Therefore, the
objective of providing evenhanded enforcement of state rights
and laws by the federal judiciary could not dictate an unques-
tioned application of those laws. 55 Rather, the state's interest in
applying its law so as to avoid divergent outcomes must be
weighed against competing federal policy interests.56
While balancing the competing federal and state interests
in applying their respective laws, the Byrd Court noted that the
Seventh Amendment and its protection of the jury trial was an
essential part of the federal court system.57 The state interest
in allocating to the trial judge the task of deciding whether a
party to a litigation was a statutory employee proved less
weighty.58 The state interest was accorded lower weight since
48. See id. at 533-34 (citing Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co., 96 S.E.2d 566
(1957)).
49. See id. at 533-34.
50. See id. at 536-39.
51. See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 537-38.
54. See id. at 538-39.
55. See id. at 537-38.
56. See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 538.
57. See id. at 539.
58. See id. at 538.
19971 205
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this state allocation of power to a judge was not inseparably in-
tertwined with a particular right but rather was based upon
state policy.59 As a result, the state interest, which assigns to
the judge the resolution of factual issues, was outweighed by
the counter assignment of that function within the federal sys-
tem to the jury via the Seventh Amendment. 60
Thus, Byrd added to the Erie line of cases the need to bal-
ance competing state and federal interests where state and fed-
eral procedural law directly conflicted. 61  In making a
determination of whether state law should be applied in federal
courts, the Court stated that "countervailing considerations"
would have to be examined together with the effects on a litiga-
tion's outcome. 62 However, the Court failed to articulate any
clear list of such factors. 63 What the Supreme Court did articu-
late was a general proposition that those elements which are
essential to the process of the federal judiciary and supported
by the Constitution, such as allocation of certain functions to
the jury under the Seventh Amendment, are on the counter con-
siderations list.6
Lastly, after directing that a balancing of competing federal
and state interests be conducted, the Supreme Court redirected
its analysis to address the potential of divergent outcomes. 65
Although possible, the fact that a "different result would follow"
under federal as opposed to state law was found to be dubious,
especially in light of elements which existed within the federal
system that would reduce any such divergence. 66 One such ele-
ment that would decrease the potential for divergent outcomes
in a particular case was the federal trial court judge's authority
to review the weight of the evidence.67 Since federal court
judges are authorized to grant new trials when the verdict does
not comport with the weight of the evidence, the possibility of
59. See id. at 534-36.
60. See id. at 539.
61. See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537-39.
62. See id. at 537-39.
63. See id. at 537-38.
64. Id. at 539.
65. See id. at 539-40.
66. See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 539.
67. See id. at 539-40.
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divergent verdicts is greatly decreased, as is the weight of the
state's interest in having its law applied.68
4. Hanna v. Plumer69
The Hanna Court, revisiting the outcome-determinative
test articulated in Guaranty Trust, declared that the test was
never developed to be a "talisman"70 or a "litmus test"71 to deter-
mine whether to apply state law in a federal diversity case.7 2
However, the Hanna court did reaffirm the stance that federal
courts should apply state substantive law and federal proce-
dural law. 73 Noting the potential for confusion as to where one
begins and the other ends, the Court recognized that the line
between the two characteristics varied depending on the legal
nature of a case.74 As such, the Court, frowning on strict, uni-
form implementation of a substantive-procedural analysis, ad-
vocated an application that would advance the "twin aims of the
Erie doctrine: discouragement of forum-shopping and the
avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws."75
However, the Hanna Court ruled that the analysis embod-
ied in the Erie doctrine's substantive-procedural dichotomy
need not be employed when a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
covered the issue in question, irrespective of conflicting state
law.76 Although the Court conceded that the Erie doctrine anal-
ysis had been applied in cases where one party argued that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure controlled, applying the Erie
doctrine on those occasions was appropriate because the scope
of the Rules was being construed broadly.77 However, where a
state law conflicted with a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and
the latter was sufficiently broad to clearly speak to the issue in
question, the federal rule must be applied, assuming it was a
valid exercise of Congress' power under the Rules Enabling Act,
68. See id.
69. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
70. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467-68.
71. Id. at 466-67.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 465-66.
74. See id. at 471.
75. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
76. See id. at 470.
77. See id.
1997] 207
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as extended to the Supreme Court. 78 If however, the rule's
scope did not speak directly to the issue at hand, the Erie doc-
trine analysis would control.79
C. Erie Doctrine Applied to the Review of New Trial Motion
for Excessive Jury Awards
1. The Second Circuit and the Erie Doctrine
In 1952, the Second Circuit ruled that where federal juris-
diction is based upon diversity, the law of the state in which the
federal court sits governs the measure of damages.80 However,
the court later questioned whether the standard to be employed
when weighing the sufficiency of evidence in such a case was to
be provided by state or federal law.8 ' Without settling the is-
sue,8 2 the Second Circuit commented that the process of judging
whether a trial court order directing that a new trial be had on
grounds of excessive damages "[wals usually considered a mat-
ter of federal law."8 3 This issue remained unsettled in the Sec-
ond Circuit, at least until 1981, when the court acknowledged
that the task of answering the question of whether federal of
state law applied to this decision 'had been a source of difficulty
for federal courts." 4
On an appeal from a trial court denial to set aside a verdict
on grounds of excessiveness in Martell v. Boardwalk Enter-
prises, Inc. ,85 the Second Circuit stated that trial court action
would be weighed against an abuse of discretion standard,
which was derived from federal case law.8 6 However, the court
continued, in order for a federal court to decide whether the size
of the jury set damages "shocked the judicial conscience" to a
sufficient degree to warrant being set aside, reference must be
made to comparable awards upheld in the state that provided
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See Emerman v. Cohen, 199 F.2d 857, 858 (2d Cir. 1952).
81. See Index Fund, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 580 F.2d 1158,
1163 (2d Cir. 1978).
82. See id. at 1163.
83. Id. at 1163.
84. Hegger v. Green, 646 F.2d 22, 29-30, n.8 (2d Cir. 1981).
85. 748 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1984) (involving a personal injury case based upon
diversity jurisdiction).
86. See id. at 750.
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the action being sued upon.8 7 In doing so, the Martell Court
directed that federal court determinations on the issue of jury
award excessiveness should mirror the maximum award level
which would be condoned by state law.88
The stance in Martell was affirmed by the Second Circuit in
Consorti v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc.89 The Consorti
Court, conducting an Erie analysis, determined that the ques-
tion of what level of damages would be proper to award for a
given injury was substantive in nature and should be controlled
by state law. 90 However, the Court opined that the New York
standard of equating excessiveness with any award that "devi-
ated materially"91 from reasonable compensation was ambigu-
ous. 92  Nevertheless, the Second Circuit validated the
application of state law, equating New York's "deviates materi-
ally" standard of reviewing excessive jury awards to a statuto-
rily specified damage awards maximum, which the court noted
was clearly substantive.93
2. The Supreme Court's Application of Erie to Jury
Award Review
The Supreme Court, on two separate occasions, has sug-
gested that when an appellate court reviews a damages award
granted by a jury, it is governed by federal law.94 Further, the
Court has ruled that federal law should be applied by federal
87. Id.(quoting United States ex rel. Larkin v. Oswald, 510 F.2d 583, 589 (2d
Cir. 1975)).
88. See id. at 740.
89. 72 F.3d 1003 (2d Cir. 1995).
90. Id. at 1011.
91. See infra Part II.D.
92. See Consorti, 72 F.3d at 1012.
93. See id. at 1011. The Second Circuit's decision was vacated by the
Supreme Court so that the decision might be reviewed in light of the standard
embodied within Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc. See Consorti v. Owens-
Corning Fiberglas Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2576 (1996). On remand, the Second Circuit
confirmed that its initial ruling, which provided that state law applies in federal
cases based on diversity jurisdiction, where the issue before the court was whether
a jury award was excessive, was in line with the Supreme Court decision in Gas-
perini. See Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 103 F.3d 2 (2d Cir. 1996).
94. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2211, 2236-37
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Browning-Ferris Ind. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 278-79 (1989); Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., Inc.,
429 U.S. 648, 649-50 (1977)).
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courts sitting in diversity in cases where there is a potential for
infringement upon the rights of the Seventh Amendment as a
result of operation by state law.95 One such case which holds
that the review of jury damage verdicts in a federal diversity
suit should be governed by federal law is Browning-Ferris In-
dustries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.96 There, the
Supreme Court ruled that a district court's disposition of a new
trial motion on grounds for excessiveness should be guided by
the federal standard evolving out of Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 59.97 Thus, when posed with such a motion, a court should
question whether an "abuse of discretion" occurred.98
D. New York's "Deviates Materially" Standard
New York courts' traditional standard of reviewing verdicts
for excessiveness was whether the award level "shocks the con-
science." 99 The standard was identical to the one being em-
ployed by federal courts of appeals. 100 However, in 1986, New
York enacted a new standard whereby state courts were re-
quired to determine if a verdict "deviated materially" from rea-
sonable compensation.101 As Governor Mario Cuomo noted in
95. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 539 (1958);
Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 376-77 (1913). See also WRIGHT, supra
note 45, § 4511, at 314.
96. 492 U.S. at 278-279. Although stating that in a diversity case state law
was to be applied to the legal basis of recovery and the propriety of granting puni-
tive damages as well as to those elements that the jury should consider in setting
the punitive award, federal law was to supply the correct standard of review to be
employed by the district court and the court of appeals in reviewing the award.
See id. The Court drew the distinction that state law ruled in determining
whether the amount of an award was excessive for a particular injury but federal
law supplied the standard used to determine if such excessiveness was so extreme
as to warrant a new trial or remittitur. See id.
97. See id. at 279. The adopted rule, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59,
states in pertinent part that "[a] new trial may be granted to all or any of the
issues . . .in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the
reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the
courts of the United States." FED. R. CIv. P. 59.
98. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 279; see also Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at
2223.
99. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c) commentary at C5501:10 (McKinney 1995).
100. See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2217 (citing Consorti v. Armstrong World
Indus., Inc., 72 F.3d 1001, 1012-13 (2d Cir. 1995)).
101. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c) commentary at C5501:10.
In reviewing a money judgment in an action in which an itemized verdict is
required... in which it is contended that the award is excessive or inade-
210
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his executive memoranda that was issued on the day he signed
the new standard into law, the purpose of the legislative change
was to implement a standard of review of jury awards that
would allow for greater appellate court discretion. 10 2 Relaxing
the pre-1986 standard of review, the new standard provided
New York appellate courts greater leeway to modify verdicts
that they deemed unreasonable or excessive. 10 3 Although the
new standard was directed at appellate courts, application of
the standard by New York's trial courts to overturn excessive
damages awards has been validated by several departments. 10 4
Some New York state courts have noted that a continued adher-
ence to the former "shocks the conscience" standard by a trial
court is erroneous, reasoning that trial courts should be apply-
ing the same standard as appellate courts. 10 5
III. Appellate Review of Excessiveness of Jury Awards
A. Federal Review
1. The Adoption of the Seventh Amendment
One of the major controversies surrounding the newly-
drafted Constitution was the lack of an express number of pro-
visions articulating a basic sets of rights to be guaranteed to the
new country's citizens. 06 One such right that was enjoyed by
quate and that a new trial should have been granted unless a stipulation is
entered to a different award, the appellate division shall determine that an
award is excessive or inadequate if it deviates materially from what would
be reasonable compensation.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c).
102. See 1986 N.Y. Laws 682. In the words of Governor Cuomo, the new stan-
dard "will assure greater scrutiny of the amount of verdicts and promote greater
stability in the tort system and greater fairness for similarly situated defendants
throughout the State." Id.; see also Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2217-18.
103. See Consorti, 72 F.3d at 1003; O'Connor v. Graziosi, 131 A.D.2d 553, 554,
516 N.Y.S.2d 276, 277 (2d Dep't 1987).
104. See Shea v. Icelandair, 925 F. Supp. 1014, 1021 (S.D.N.Y 1996) (citing
Inya v. Ide Hyundai, Inc., 209 A.D.2d 1015, 619 N.Y.S.2d 440 (4th Dep't 1994);
Prunty v. YMCA of Lockport, Inc., 206 A.D.2d 911, 912, 616 N.Y.S.2d 117, 118 (4th
Dep't 1994); Cochetti v. Gralow, 192 A.D. 2d 974, 597 N.Y.S.2d 234 (3d Dep't 1993);
Shurgan v. Tedesco, 179 A.D.2d 805, 806, 578 N.Y.S.2d 658, 659 (2d Dep't 1992)).
105. See Wendell v. Supermarkets General Corp., 189 A.D.2d 1063, 1064-65,
592 N.Y.S.2d 895, 896-97 (3d Cir. 1993); In re New York City Asbestos Litigation,
173 Misc.2d 121, 660 N.Y.S.2d 803 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1990).
106. See J. R. POLE, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION FOR AND AGAINST 17, 17-18
(1987); see also THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES: THE COLONIAL AND REVOLU-
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the colonists but was absent from the main text of the Constitu-
tion was a provision ensuring the right to jury trial. 10 7 Prior to
the creation of a federal Constitution, eleven of the thirteen
states had adopted specific provisions within their respective
state constitutions ensuring the right to a civil trial by jury. 08
An attempt was made to insert a provision into the Constitution
which would guarantee that "trial by jury shall be preserved as
usual in civil cases." 0 9 However, due to the diversity of treat-
ment and use of the jury trial among the states, no "usual" stan-
dard existed so this provision was not inserted." 0 The absence
of an express provision creating the right to a jury trial in civil
suits caused much consternation."'
A source of concern for the future status of the right to a
jury trial was the expansive scope of review that was extended
to the Supreme Court via Article III, § 2, cl. 2.112 That provision
granted the Supreme Court appellate authority to review ques-
tions of both law and fact.1 13 The objection to this scope of fed-
eral appellate review was that facts found by a jury would be
subject to a type of re-examination which differed from that
which was allowed "according to the rules of the common
TIONARY ORIGINS OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES 35 (Patrick T. Conley & John P. Kamin-
ski eds., Madison House 1992). "Immediately upon the adjournment of the
Constitutional Convention, Anti-federalists began their campaign against the Con-
stitution because of its omission of a bill of rights." Id. at 25; Chicago, Burlington
and Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 243 (1897).
107. U.S. CONST.
108. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND 86, 88-89
(1977).
109. ROBERT ALLEN RuTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791,
117 (1991).
110. Id.
111. See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830). It was during a
Constitutional Convention debate concerning the right to jury trial that the first
motion was made to include in the soon to be proposed Constitution, a Bill of
Rights which would provide for a number of fundamental rights. See also
ScHwARTz, supra note 108, at 104.
112. See Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,
243 (1897); United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C. Mass., May Term
1812) (No. 17, 750); Brief for the Petitioner at 23, Gasperini v. Center for Humani-
ties, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996) (No. 95-719) (quoting Slocum v. N.Y. Life Insur-
ance Co., 228 U.S. 364, 377 (1913)).
113. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. "[Tlhe Supreme Court shall have ap-
pellate jurisdiction, both as to [1aw and [flact . " Id.
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law."11 4 In response to the proposed Constitution, eight states,
concerned with the adoption of a Bill of Rights, advanced sepa-
rate proposed amendments. 115 Of the eight states, seven noted
the right to jury trials in civil cases as part of the amendment
proposals. 116 No personal right was more frequently demanded
by the states in the proposed amendments. 1 7 Ultimately, the
Federalists, who characterized the inclusion of a clause grant-
ing the right to a jury trial as unnecessary, 118 conceded that the
right would be amended to the Constitution by the First
Congress.119
As anti-federalists voiced their concern that the constitu-
tional grant of appellate review as exercised by the Supreme
Court would indirectly culminate in the demise of the jury trial,
the rights now secured by the Seventh Amendment began to
come into constitutional focus. 120 James Madison concerned
with the future of the right to trial by jury in civil cases sought
to have the right preserved in its common law form.' 2' Madison
made a proposal during the first session of Congress that the
114. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R. Co, 166 U.S. at 243; United Gas
Public Service Co. v. State of Texas, 303 U.S. 123, 151 (1938) (Black, J.,
concurring).
115. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 108, at 156-57.
116. See id. at 158.
117. See id. at 156-58. Out of all Bill of Right guarantees proposed to be em-
bodied in the amendments, guarantees which did not speak to the personal rights
of individuals that were proposed by each of the eight states were the right of the
states to reserve those powers not specifically granted to the federal government, a
bar on Congress from interfering in elections and a limit on the federal power to
tax. See EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 32-
33 (Greenwood Press 1979) (1957).
118. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). Alexander Hamilton
acknowledged the "essentiality of trial by jury in civil cases" within the new gov-
ernments structure. See id. at 259 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d
ed. 1981). However, Mr. Hamilton argued that the right to a jury trial would be
unaffected by the Constitution's adoption. See id. at 257.
119. See Donald S. Lutz, The U.S. Bill of Rights in Historical Perspective, in
CONTEXTS OF THE BiLL OF RIGHTS 12 (Stephen L. Schechter and Richard B. Bern-
stein eds., 1990). James Madison, a Federalist and a believer in the idea that a bill
of rights was both dangerous and unnecessary, had promised that if the constitu-
tion was ratified, he would support legislation adopting a bill of rights. See id.
120. See The Justices v. Murray, 76 U.S. (1 Wall.) 273, 281-82 (1870) (citing
THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)); see also Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins.
Co., 228 U.S. 364, 377 (1913).
121. ScHwARTz, supra note 108, at 167. See also Capital Traction Co. v. Hof,
174 U.S. 1, 7 (1899).
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Constitution's grant of appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme
Court be augmented so as to include the language, "nor shall
any fact, triable by a jury, be otherwise re-examinable than ac-
cording to the principles of the common law."122 The proposal
was defeated but its substance is reflected in the Seventh
Amendment.123 The debate on the right to civil trial by jury
culminated in the adoption of the Seventh Amendment, to-
gether with the other rights secured by the Bill of Rights. 124
The ratified and adopted form of the Seventh Amendment reads
as follows: "[iun suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of common law."' 25 With hindsight, the Supreme
Court has affirmed that intent behind the adoption of the Sev-
enth Amendment in its final form was drawn in such a manner
so as to protect the jury trial right and to foreclose appellate
factual review that is counter to the common law tradition.' 26
2. Seventh Amendment's Re-examination Restriction is
Derived From Common Law.
a. Could you be more specific?
The Seventh Amendment provides that the re-examination
of factual determinations made by a jury will only be permitted
"according to the rules of the common law."' 27 However, the
Amendment failed to articulate from which common law the
rules were to be derived. 28 The amorphous reference to com-
mon law in the Amendment also failed to designate the specific
time period of common law to which the Amendment re-
ferred.129 As a result, two questions were left unanswered:
which common law should apply and during what time period of
that common law should the Seventh Amendment be framed.
122. Hof, 174 U.S. at 7.
123. See id. at 7.
124. See ScHwARTz, supra note 108, at 181-86.
125. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
126. See Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,
243 (1897); Jacob v. City of New York, 315 U.S. 752 (1942).
127. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
128. See id.
129. See id.
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The reference to common law was not directed at the com-
mon law taking shape in the colonies at the time of the Seventh
Amendment's adoption.130 One reason cited as support for this
contention is that the diversity of the law between colonies was
extensive. 13' Rather, it has been generally held that the com-
mon law applicable to questions involving the Seventh Amend-
ment is actually English common law.' 32 Further, the general
consensus has been that any interpretation of the Seventh
Amendment's mandate hinges on the status of common law as
it existed at the time of the Amendment's adoption in 1791.133
b. English Common Law and the Nisi Prius
System 3 4 in 1791
The geographic base of the English common law system, at
the time of the adoption of the Seventh Amendment, was in
Westminster, England. 35 At the courts in Westminster, civil
trials were commenced and pleadings were conducted. 136 Trials
progressed there, with a full court of judges, sitting en banc,137
presiding over and ruling on legal issues. 38 However, the en
130. See Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 8 (1899) (noting that Con-
gress, when discussing the adoption of the Seventh Amendment, "had in view the
rules of the common law of England; and not the rules of that law as modified by
local statute or usage in any of the states").
131. See United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C. Mass., Mat Term
1812) (No. 16, 750) ("the common law [the Seventh Amendment] alluded to is not
the common law of any individual state, (for it probably differs in all)").
132. See Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935);
see also Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476-77 (1935); Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon
National Bank, 260 U.S. 235, 243 (1922); Root v. Railway Co., 105 U.S. 189, 206-07
(1881) (citing Fenn v. Holme, 62 U.S. 21 How.) 481 (1858)).
133. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937);
Redman, 295 U.S. at 657; Dimick, 293 U.S. at 476.
134. Nisi Prius courts are "courts [which] are held for the trial of issues of fact
before a jury and one presiding judge." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1047 (6th ed.
1991).
135. See GEOFFREY RADCLIFFE & GEOFFREY CROSS, THE ENGLISH LEGAL Sys-
TEM 91 (G.J. Hand & D.J. Bentley eds., 6th ed. 1977).
136. See id. at 177-78.
137. See id. at 182; En banc is a "full bench" or "a session where the entire
membership of the court will participate in the decision rather than the regular
quorum." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 526-27 (6th ed. 1991).
138. See THEODORE F.T. PLuCKNErr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF COMMON LAW 166
(5th ed. 1956).
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banc court would not ordinarily rule on issues of fact at
Westminster.139
When a disputed issue of fact arose, the en banc court in
Westminster directed a jury trial be conducted via the nisi
prius system. 140 Nisi Prius was functionally a circuit system,
established for civil cases in 1285 by the Statute of Westminster
II.141 However, the nisi prius "trial judge was not a [separate]
court" 42 from the en banc court, but rather, merely an exten-
sion of the court in Westminster. 43 Further, the system func-
tioned solely for the convenience of the en banc court. 44 The
system called for certain court officers to leave Westminster
throughout the year and travel through England, forming a cir-
cuit structure, to preside over trials on issues of fact.145 On
writs of nisi prius, 46 officers acting within the nisi prius system
performed the functions of supervising the jury trial and docu-
menting the ultimate verdict when reached. 147 When a verdict
was reached at the nisi prius trial, that proceeding was com-
plete and the nisi prius' authority over the proceeding was
terminated. 48
The use of this system did not extend beyond its functional
purpose of avoiding the burden of calling jurors, witnesses and
parties to Westminster. 49 That is, the nisi prius judge could
not enter judgment, but rather returned to Westminster with
the verdict, where it was "added to the record of the case." 50
Upon receiving the verdict, the en banc court at Westminster
proceeded to enter judgment.' 5'
139. See RADCLIFFE & CROSS, supra note 135, at 182.
140. See id. at 92.
141. See id. at 91.
142. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 20, 117 (2nd
ed. 1979).
143. See id. at 19-20.
144. See id. at 19.
145. See RADCLIFFE & CROSS, supra note 135, at 182.
146. See BAKER, supra note 142, at 19.
147. W.J.V. WINDEYER, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 137 (2nd ed. 1949).
148. See RADCLIFFE & CROSS, supra note 135, at 185.
149. See id. at 92.
150. See id. at 92, 135.
151. See id. at 185.
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Before entering a judgment, however, the en banc court ac-
cepted and ruled on all motions for new trials.152 If a motion for
a new trial was made, it was necessary to present such motion
to the en banc court before it entered judgment.153 The bases for
new trial motions were that the damages awarded were exces-
sive, the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, or the
instructions given to the jury were erroneous.154 In reviewing
the motion, the en banc court had the benefit of the "notes taken
by the trial judge and his report on the trial."15 5 Nevertheless, a
survey of English cases revealed that motions for a new trial
based upon erroneous factual determinations by a jury would
only be granted if such action was certified by the trial judge. 156
Motions for new trials differed from an appeal of the verdict
via a writ of error.157 The latter was a means of appealing from
an en banc court's judgment and was "in form, a new action
commenced on a new writ."158 As to the former, when an en
banc court reviewed a new trial motion, it was not acting "in the
capacity of a superior court."159 However, since the en banc
court commanded full authority to rule on these motions, addi-
tional or subsequent factual review by the appellate courts was
foreclosed. 160
c. English Common Law Appellate Review
At the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted, the ave-
nues available for rehearing a civil case at English common law
were severely limited.161 After the en banc court had entered
the judgment, the only avenue open for appeal was that of a
152. See id. at 186.
153. See BAKER, supra note 142, at 119-20.
154. See RADCLIFFE & CROSS, supra note 135, at 186.
155. See id. at 186.
156. See 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2819, n.18 (2d 1995) (citing Maxfield Weisbrod, Limitations on Trial by Jury in
Illinois, 19 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 91, 92 (1940)).
157. See 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH COMMON LAW 213-
214 (7th ed. 1971). For explanation of writ of error, see infra text accompanying
notes 160-69.
158. WINDEYER, supra note 147, at 142-43.
159. BAKER, supra note 142, at 120.
160. See id. at 120.
161. See RADCLIFFE & CROSS, supra note 135, at 210.
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writ of error.162 Only on writs of error were the en banc judges
directed to forward a case to a superior court. 163 However, writs
of error were limited to legal issues "upon the face of the pro-
ceeding."164 Since a writ of error was the only means of appeal,
there was no avenue to review "an error in the determination of
facts." 65 Therefore, a disgruntled party could not bring a writ
of error claiming that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence or for the alleged erroneous denial of a new trial mo-
tion on the same grounds.166
An appeal, or writ of error, re-designated the case to a court
different from the court in which the judgment was entered.167
That is, on a writ of error, an appellant commenced an "entirely
new proceeding" in a separate court. 68 In so reviewing, an ap-
pellate court could order a remittitur in certain cases, whereby
the award winner was given the choice of accepting a reduced
damages award or having a new trial ordered. 69 However, as
to new trial motions, a trial court's denial was not reviewable on
a writ of error. 70
162. See BAKER, supra note 142, at 120.
163. See id. at 118-20.
164. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
405-06 (1967). Examples of errors that could be included in a writ of error were en
banc decisions on a demurrer as well as any jury instructions that were given by
the judge, if objected to on the record. WINDEYER, supra note 147, at 142-43.
165. BLACKSTONE, supra note 164, at 405-06. An appeal on a writ of error was
"only on a question of law, never on questions of fact." WINDEYER, supra note 147,
at 142-43.
166. See RADCLIFFE & CROSS, supra note 135, at 211-12.
167. See id. at 210.
168. See id. at 210.
169. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 482-87 (1935). The power of federal
appellate courts to employ the use of a remittitur was validated as early as 1822 by
Justice Story. See id. at 483. Justice Story, finding that the use of a remittitur
was not in violation of the Seventh Amendment, noted that the practice was em-
ployed by English courts at the time the Seventh Amendment bar on appellate
review of facts was adopted. See id. at 484-85.
170. See RADCLIFFE & CROSS, supra note 135, at 211-12; WINDEYER, supra
note 147, at 142-43.
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3. Application of Common Law: The American Tradition
a. Supreme Court History Upholds the Seventh
Amendment and Common Law Interpretation
The Supreme Court established, through "a longstanding
and well-reasoned line of precedent that" federal appellate
courts were barred from reviewing factual issues settled by a
jury.171 A principal source of the prohibition on appellate re-
view based was the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Re-
examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment. 172 The Court
has viewed the Clause as a general prohibition on federal appel-
late courts from re-examining factual findings of a jury. 73 The
interpretation was consistent with the belief that the Re-exami-
nation Clause was actually drafted to allay fears that the appel-
late courts would wield the power to grant new trials on factual
issues.174
Justice Story provided the first definitive interpretation of
the Seventh Amendment's restriction on appellate factual re-
view in Parsons v. Bedford.175 The question presented in Par-
sons was whether it was error for a federal district court judge
to refuse to transcribe certain testimonial facts so that they
may be used for review by an appellate court. 76 Ruling that the
purpose of the transcript was to provide a record of trial infor-
mation to facilitate the review of the facts underlying the ver-
171. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2211, 2230
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia interpreted this line of precedent to
bar a federal appellate court from revisiting a district court's denial of a motion for
a new trial premised on the grounds that the jury award was excessive. See id. at
2232. See also Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474, 481
(1983).
172. See Fairmount Glass Works, 287 U.S. at 482-83 (other sources which
have been citing as support for inhibiting appellate review of trial court rulings on
new trial motions include (1) the language of §22 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, (2)
the "historical limitation of the writ of error to matters within the record," which
did not include new trial motions and (3) that the issue was simply a matter that
should remain at the discretion of the trial court); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3
Pet.) 433, 443-44 (1830). See also United Gas Public Service Co. v. State of Texas,
303 U.S. 123, 151 (1938) (Black, J., concurring).
173. See Parsons, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 447-48.
174. See Walker v. New Mexico & Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 593,
596; United States v. Wonson, 28 F.Cas. 745, 750 (C.C. Mass., May Term 1812)
(No. 16, 750).
175. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830)
176. See id. at 441-43.
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dict, Justice Story reasoned that such district court action was
not error. 177 Justice Story stated that such action would have
been considered error if the Supreme Court could have acted on
the record or performed some factual review. 178 However, the
common law system of review, extended to the federal system
via the Re-examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment,
barred such review of fact findings determined by a jury.179 As
was the case at common law, such facts can only be re-examined
via a new trial, which could only be granted "by the court where
the issue was tried or to which the record was properly returna-
ble, or... by an appellate court for some error of law." 80
The question which logically follows is which issues are en-
compassed in the fact-finding domain of the jury. The acts of
weighing witness credibility and reaching ultimate conclusions
from controverted facts are well within the scope of the jury's
sole authority.' 8 ' Stated otherwise, the determination of liabil-
ity in a case was a factual issue to be settled by a jury.8 2 Addi-
tionally, the determination as to the correct level of assignable
damages to a particular injury illustrated a question of fact to
be determined by the jury.183 Assuming there is no violation of
a statutory designated maximum recovery amount, 184 an in-
quiry into a damages award on the grounds of excessiveness is a
177. See id. at 443-49.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. Parsons, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 448. This common law limitation has been
echoed by the Supreme Court on a number of occasions. See Capital Traction Co.
v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13 (1899); Lincoln v. Power, 151 U.S. 436, 438 (1894); New York
Cent. & Hudson R.R. Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U.S. 24, 31 (1879); Slocum v. N.Y. Life
Insurance Co., 228 U.S. 364, 397 (1913); Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v.
Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935).
181. See Ellis v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 329 U.S. 649, 653 (1947); Tennant v.
Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944).
182. See Ellis, 329 U.S. at 652-53; Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474,486 (1935);
Preston v. Prather, 137 U.S. 604, 609 (1891). See also WRIGHT supra note 156,
§ 2820, at 208.
183. See Dimick, 293 U.S. at 486; Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 29 (1889).
See also Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2211, 2232 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648,
661 (1915)).
184. See Miller v. Maryland Casualty Co., 40 F.2d 463, 464 (2d Cir. 1930) (cit-
ing Southern Ry.-Carolina Div. v. Bennett, 233 U.S. 80 (1914)). See also WRIGHT
supra note 156, § 2820, at 207.
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question of fact, 185 and remains such on appeal. 8 6 Accordingly,
a subsequent motion for a new trial based upon a claim of ex-
cessiveness of a jury award is also considered strictly a question
of fact. 187
The Supreme Court has historically ruled that federal ap-
pellate courts are barred from reviewing a jury verdict for dam-
ages as being against the weight of the evidence. 88
Furthermore, the bar on appellate review of factual issues de-
termined by a jury extends to the Supreme Court, regardless of
whether the case arises from a state or federal court. 8 9 In ad-
dressing any such action, the Court has stated that any factual
review thereon be undertaken solely at the direction of the trial
court. 190 Thus, where the instructions posed to the jury were
185. See Craft, 237 U.S. at 661. The issue of whether a given jury verdict is
excessive represents a question of fact since excessiveness is "not determinable by
any fixed and certain rule of law" but rather "involves an estimate on the part of
the court of the force and efficacy of the evidence." Metropolitan R.R. Co. v. Moore,
121 U.S. 558, 574 (1887).
186. See Bennett, 233 U.S. at 87; Herencia v. Guzman, 219 U.S. 44 (1910);
Wabash Ry. Co. v. McDaniels, 107 U.S. 454, 456 (1883). The Court noted that
since "there was evidence proper for the consideration of the jury the objection that
the ... damages were excessive cannot be considered." Herencia, 219 U.S. at 45.
187. See Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474, 481-82
(1933); Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2232 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Moore, 121
U.S. at 574.) See also WRIGHT supra note 156, § 2820, at 208.
188. See McCaughn v. Real Estate Land Title & Trust Co., 297 U.S. 606, 608
(1936); Lehnen v. Dickson, 148 U.S. 71, 72-73 (1893); Wilson v. Everett, 139 U.S.
616, 621 (1891); Lancaster v. Collins, 115 U.S. 222, 225 (1885).
189. See Republican River Bridge Co. v. Kansas Pac. R.R. Co., 92 U.S. 315,
317(1875). See also Kaufman v. Tredway, 195 U.S. 271, 273 (1904) (issue of
whether payment of money was made while payor was insolvent and whether re-
cipient had cause to know such was intended as a preference was not reviewable
by the Court); Packet Co. v. McCue, 84 U.S. 508, 514 (1873) (where the jury was
posed with the issue of whether decedent was still within the master-servantrela-
tionship when he slipped off a dock and died of injuries sustained, "their decision
on [this] question of fact [was] not subject to review" by the Supreme Court");
Marine Ins. Co. of Alexandria v. Young, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 187, 191 (1809) (the
Court could not revisit the factual issue submitted to the jury of whether defend-
ant had notice of an approaching storm).
190. See New York, L.E. & W.R.R. v. Winter's Adm'r, 143 U.S. 60, 75 (1892);
Barreda v. Silsbee, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 146, 166-67 (1859); Parsons v. Bedford, 28
U.S. (3 Pet) 443, 447 (1830). See also Atlantic and Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Eller-
man Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 358-59 (1962) (Neither the Supreme Court or a
court of appeals could "redetermine facts found by the jury any more than the
[d]istrict [clourt can predetermine them.").
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legally sound and there did not exist an alternative legal ques-
tion at issue, subsequent appellate review was foreclosed. 191
As stated, this review prohibition has included the review
of whether a jury award was excessive. 192 Even if an appellate
court thought the jury award returned should have been a
higher or lower amount, that court lacked the power to affect
that verdict. 93 Since verdict excessiveness reflected a factual
matter rather than an issue of law, denials for new trials based
upon verdict excessiveness cannot be revisited on appeal.
94
That is, because motions for new trials for verdict excessiveness
are necessarily factual questions, the denial of such a motion
based upon a claim that the verdict was counter to the weight of
the evidence is not subject to review. 195
b. A Few Cracks in the Wall: Some Cases Tinker
With the Scope of the Seventh Amendment
The Seventh Amendment and its bar on appellate re-exam-
ination of facts has not been interpreted and applied as a legal
straightjacket, denying any trace of modern judicial develop-
ment in favor of the minutiae of common law practice.
96
191. See Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R.R. Co. v. Converse, 139 U.S.
469, 475 (1891); New York Cent. & Hudson R.R. Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U.S. 24, 31
(1879). But see WRIGHT supra note 156, § 2818, at 197.
192. See generally St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648, 661 (1915);
Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2232, n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Wabash Ry. Co.
v. McDaniels, 107 U.S. 454, 456 (1883) ("That we are without authority to disturb
the judgment upon the grounds that the damages are excessive cannot be
doubted.")); Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 29 (1889).
193. Fraloff, 100 U.S. at 24. "[Hlowever it was ascertained by the court that
the verdict was too large.., the granting or refusing a new trial in a Circuit Court
of the United States is not subject to review by this court." Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at
2232, n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v.
Mann, 130 U.S. 69, 75 (1889)); Wilson, 139 U.S. at 621 (the Supreme Court was
barred from redetermining whether a $10,000.00 jury verdict "should have been
for either $5,000. or $15,000").
194. See Wilson, 139 U.S. at 621; Craft, 237 U.S. at 661. See also Arkansas
Valley Land v. Cattle Co., 130 U.S. 69 (1889). See also WRIGHT supra note 156,
§ 2820, at 218.
195. U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 248 (1940); Kennon, 131
U.S. at 29; see also The "Abbotsford", 98 U.S. 440, 444-45 (1878).
196. See Galloway v. U.S., 319 U.S. 372, 390-92 (1943). See, e.g., Gasoline
Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1930). In an action for
breach of contract where there were issues of liability and damages, an appellate
grant of a new trial solely for on the issue of damages was upheld even though a
grant allowing for a new trial of part of an action was nonexistent at common law.
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Rather, the Court has repetitively articulated a stance that the
Seventh Amendment draws into the federal judicial system only
the essential substance and not the entire form of practice at
common law.197 That view maintains that not every common
law procedural element need be adhered to in the federal sys-
tem.198 Such a stance could be validated on grounds that the
rules which existed at the time the Seventh Amendment was
adopted were not exactly "crystalized into a fixed and immuta-
ble system," but were rather in a state of flux and constant de-
velopment. 199 Nevertheless, the Court has continued to reduce
the scope of procedural elements which enjoy the protection
provided by the Seventh Amendment. 200 Recently, the Court
has declared that the Seventh Amendment protection extends
only to those "incidents which are regarded as fundamental...
and of the essence of the system of trial by jury."20 1
4. Mirroring Common Law, Federal Trial Courts Can
Alter Jury Findings
As was the practice at common law, federal trial courts had
the power to review certain factual issues determined by the
jury, including the size of awarded damages. 20 2 In actuality,
only the trial judge could exercise the authority to field factual
errors arising from the trial.203 In performing such a review,
the trial or district court judge determines if the evidence
See id. at 497. In validating its action, the Court noted that it was "not now con-
cerned with the form of the ancient rule," but rather with its substance." Id. at
498. But see Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon National Bank, 260 U.S. 235, 242 (1922)
('The right of trial by jury is preserved exactly as it was at common law.").
197. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 336 (1979); Baltimore &
Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935); Galloway v. U.S., 319
U.S. 372, 390-92 (1943).
198. See Redman, 295 U.S. at 657; Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920);
Walker v. New Mexico & Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897).
199. Galloway v. U.S., 319 U.S. 372, 389-92(1943).
200. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, __ (1996).
201. Id. at - (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 (1987).
202. See Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474, 481-83,
n. 8 (1933) (providing an extensive listing of cases noting that such decision is
within the discretion of the trial judge); Arkansas Valley Land v. Cattle Co., 130
U.S. 69 (1889). But see Dagnello v. Long Island Lighting Co., 289 F.2d 797, 802-
803 (2d Cir. 1961).
203. See Fairmount Glass Works, 287 U.S. at 481; U.S. v. Laub, 37 U.S. 1, 5
(1838).
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presented and submitted to the jury was sufficient to support
the verdict.20 4 After the jury has settled all factual questions
and set an award, facts could be re-examined via a new trial
granted "by the court where the issue was tried or to which the
record was properly returnable."20 5 A trial judge, in contem-
plating whether to grant a new trial, could draw his conclusions
directly from the evidence he saw and witnesses he heard tes-
tify first hand.20 6 By operation of those determinations, trial
court judges were able to provide a sufficient safety valve
whereby excessive or runaway verdicts were examined and
regulated.20 7
5. The Second Circuit Extends Appellate Reach
In Miller v. Maryland Casualty Co.,208 the Second Circuit,
posed with a trial court denial of a new trial motion grounded
upon the level of damages awarded, stated that it lacked the
power to review the motion on appeal. 20 9 In support of its rul-
ing, the court noted that at common law, a new trial motion was
a separated review process from a bill of exceptions and that
there was no review of trial court decisions on such motions. 210
Without a violation of a statutorily set damages limit,21' rulings
as to the excessiveness of damages was to remain within the
discretion of the trial court.212 In certain cases, however, some
appellate courts began to assert the power to review trial court
orders denying new trial motions when a case could be made
that the trial court abused its discretion. 213 Although counter to
Supreme Court practice, the Second Circuit commented that
204. See Metropolitan R.R. Co. v. Moore, 121 U.S. 558, 568 (1887). See also
WRIGHT supra note 156, § 2806, at 63-67. But see Galloway, 319 U.S. at 389.
205. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 443, 448 (1830).
206. See Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 215-16 (1947);
Moore, 121 U.S. at 572-73. See also WRIGHT supra note 156, § 2818, at 196-97.
207. See Honda Motors Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2335 (1994); Pacific Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 20 (1991).
208. 40 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1930).
209. See id. at 464.
210. See id.
211. See id (citing Southern Ry.-Carolina Div. v. Bennett, 233 U.S. 80
(1914)); Astles v. Quaker City Bus Co., 158 F.2d 979, 980 (2d Cir. 1947) (award in
excess of a statutory damage maximum would trigger a question of law that is
subject to appellate review).
212. See Miller, 40 F.2d at 464.
213. See id. at 465.
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such "gloss ha[d] become the supposed principle" and a mis-
guided general belief germinated that this type of review was
valid.214
After Miller, one case noted that limited appellate review
existed 215 whereas others found that there was no review of de-
nials of new trial motions.216 In Stevenson v. Hearst Consoli-
dated Publications, Inc.,217 the Second Circuit again clearly
articulated the doctrine that Courts of Appeals lack the author-
ity to revisit trial court orders denying or granting new trial
motions based on errors of fact, which includes the excessive-
ness of jury awards.21 8 Less than ten years later, the Second
Circuit validated such appellate review in Dagnello v. Long Is-
land Railroad Company.219
Cataloging the history of case law that barred such review,
the Dagnello court commented that it was "strange that the rule
of non-reviewability should have hung on so long," in light of
scholarly commentary in its favor.220 In validating its new
power, the Second Circuit first noted that at common law, new
trial motions were neither addressed to trial judges nor were
those judges authorized to grant new trials on grounds of mone-
tary award excessiveness. 22' The court continued its analysis
by stating that the Seventh Amendment should not be allowed
to "perpetuate in changeless form the minutiae of trial practice"
at common law.222 The court reasoned that the validation of
federal appellate court review of a trial court orders denying
new trial motions based on excessiveness would not impact the
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., Herring v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 137 F.2d 598, 599 (2d Cir.
1943) (Appellate review is allowed where there is an "improper excess ... clearly
ascertainable from the record.").
216. See Flint v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 143 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1944);
Powers v. Wilson, 110 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1940) (where a jury assessed damages
without exceeding a legal maximum, the Second Circuit hesitated to review a trial
court denial of a new trial motion, explicitly refusing to engage in an abuse of
discretion analysis).
217. 214 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1954).
218. Id. at 910.
219. 289 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1961).
220. Id. at 806.
221. See id. at 802-03 n.9.
222. Id. at 803-04 (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 490-91) (1935)
(Stone, J., dissenting).
1997] 225
27
PACE LAW REVIEW
essential elements of common law practice in the "slightest
degree."223
In an effort to derail any argument that an appellate court
was not in an efficient position to engage in such review, the
Second Circuit confirmed that appellate courts "perform this
function daily and with satisfaction to the public."224 Embrac-
ing an abuse of discretion standard, the court warned that re-
versing trial court orders related to damage excessiveness
warranted restraint yet such appellate action was necessary
when an award was "so high that it would be a denial of justice
to permit it to stand."225 Drawing support from other circuits,
the Dagnello court noted that at least eight other courts of ap-
peals had already validated such review and others seemed to
agree with such a position. 226 The Second Circuit affirmed
Dagnello's appellate review in Consorti v. Armstrong World In-
dustries, Inc., wherein it validated the application of New
York's standard thus allowing itself to revisit the facts assessed
by the jury and modify the award to a reasonable level of
compensation. 227
6. The Supreme Court Passes on Addressing the
Question of Appellate Review
The Supreme Court has approached the issue of appellate
review of factual issues settled by a jury but has never settled
223. Id. at 805.
224. See Dagnello, 289 F.2d at 806.
225. See id. at 806. Accord Narin v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 837
F.2d 565, 566-67 (1988); Yodice v. Koninklijke Nederlandsche Stoomboot Maatch-
appij, 471 F.2d 705, 706-07 (1972). But see Stonewall Insurance Co. v. Asbestos
Claims Management Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1199 (2d Cir. 1995) (a trial court denial
of a new trial motion made on grounds that the verdict was against the weight of
evidence is "one of those few rulings that is simply unavailable for appellate
review).
226. See Dagnello, 289 F.2d at 802. See also CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 156, § 2820 (all the circuits have validated this type of appellate re-
view); Grunenthal v. Long Island Railroad Co., 393 U.S. 156, 157 n.3 (1968).
227. Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 72 F.3d 1003, 1003, vacated by
Consorti, 116 S. Ct. 2576, 2576 (1996), on remand, 103 F.3d 2 (1996). The
Supreme Court invalidated the approach to the review taken by Consorti. See
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,116 S. Ct 2211, 2221 (1996). Rather, as
the Second Circuit summarized on remand, the state standard of review was to be
applied by the trial court and the federal appellate court was to review any resul-
tant determination under the standard of abuse of discretion. See Consorti, 103
F.3d at 4.
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the issue.228 In 1933, the Court was presented with the issue, in
Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., of whether it
could overturn a jury verdict based upon an abuse of discretion
by the trial court. 229 The Court recognized that it has often re-
frained from setting aside verdicts which could be characterized
as excessive, with "the circuit courts of appeals . . . generally
follow[ing] a similar polity."230 However, in the end, the Court
stopped short of ruling whether such power existed. 231
More recently in Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont,
Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., the Court addressed the issue of an
appellate court's authority to review a denial of a new trial on
the grounds of excessiveness. 232 In Browning-Ferris, the Dis-
trict Court declined to set aside a six million dollar punitive
damages award as excessive. The court of appeals, applying an
abuse of discretion standard, reviewed and affirmed the rul-
ing.233 Noting that it was not "review[ing] directly the award
for excessiveness," the Court found that the court of appeals
was correct in ruling that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion.234 However, in a footnote referring to two other
Supreme Court cases, Grunenthal v. Long Island Railroad
Co. 235 and Neese v. Southern Railway Co.,236 the Court declared
that it has never expressly extended or validated the practice of
appellate review of lower court denials of motions to set aside
excessive verdicts. 237
In Neese, the Court granted certiorari to address appellate
factual review but resolved the case without getting to the re-
view question. 238 Rather, the Court ruled that the district
court's denial of the motion was supported by the record and
was not an abuse of discretion. 239 In Grunenthal, the Court re-
viewed a court of appeals' order directing the district court to
228. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 116 S.Ct 2211, 2223 (1996).
229. 287 U.S. 474 (1933).
230. Id. at 485.
231. Id.
232. 492 U.S. 257, 257 (1989).
233. See id.
234. See id. at 278.
235. 393 U.S. 156 (1968).
236. 350 U.S. 77 (1955).
237. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 279 n.25.
238. See Neese, 350 U.S. at 77.
239. See id.
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grant a new trial unless the petitioner agreed to a remittitur.240
Avoiding the issue of constitutional appellate review, the Court
noted that even if the court of appeals was authorized to review
the District Court's ruling, the exercise of such review was un-
necessary in the present case since the facts before the court
supported the jury award. 241 Nevertheless, the Court stated
that it had actually conducted an its own independent review of
the evidence in question.242
IV. The Supreme Court Finally Speaks in Gasperini v.
Center for Humanities, Inc.243
A. Facts
William Gasperini (hereinafter "Gasperini"), a photo-jour-
nalist, entered a contract in 1990 with the Center for Humani-
ties (hereinafter "Center") to lend it 300 original color
transparencies reflecting on-site scenes in Central America. 244
The photographs, shot over a seven year period, were to be used
in an education film produced by the Center entitled Conflict in
Central America.245 The subject matter of the transparencies
ranged from political and social scenes, which were well covered
by other media, to rarely captured wartime action shots. 246 Af-
ter production was complete, the Center failed to return the
transparencies, explaining that they were lost during produc-
tion.247 As such, Gasperini filed suit in the Southern District of
New York, asserting diversity jurisdiction,248 to regain the value
240. See Grunenthal, 393 U.S. at 156-57.
241. See id. at 158-59.
242. Id. at 160.
243. 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996).
244. See Brief for the Petitioner at 2, Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,
116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996) (No. 95-719); Brief for the Respondent at 1, Gasperini v.
Center for Humanities, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996) (No. 95-719) (the district court
opinion remains unpublished so all trial facts will be provided by either peti-
tioner's or respondent's briefs to the Supreme Court. Where available, a reference
to both briefs will be given.). Copies of both briefs will be maintained at the offices
of the Pace Law Review.
245. See Petitioner's Brief at 2, Gasperini (No. 95-719); Respondent's Brief at
1, Gasperini (No. 95-719).
246. See Petitioner's Brief at 2, Gasperini (No. 95-719).
247. See id. at 2; Respondent's Brief at 1, Gasperini (No. 95-719).
248. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; see supra note 19.
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of the lost transparencies, arguing negligence, breach of con-
tract and conversion. 249
The Center admitted liability, leaving only the issue of
damages, which was tried by jury in June of 1994.250 Prior to
trial, Judge Brieant, the trial judge, denied the Center's motion
in limine251 to exclude certain evidence that was to be used to
establish an industry standard value of $1,500.00 per slide.252
At a three-day trial, Gasperini offered the testimony of several
photography experts. 253 Experts described Gasperini as a "first
class professional photojournalist," and testified as to the high
demand for Central American photos.254 Noting the trans-
parencies' potential for future value in both the editorial and
advertising market, one expert valued the 300 transparencies
at $1,500.00 each. 255 Another expert witness testified that the
value of similar transparencies, where the cost of a single use
could approach tens of thousands of dollars and repetitive use
was common, was not affected by the photographer's prior his-
tory of sales success. 256 The Center's sole witness, a "buyer of
photography," testified that he found only 47 photos of interest
and that he would pay approximately $250.00 for each per
use.25 7 However, that witness also stated that the photos had
an income generating life of 94 years and that the demand for
such transparencies could come from several sources. 258
Additional evidence, including both visual exhibits and a
showing of the film produced with Gasperini's transparencies,
Conflict in Central America, was provided for the jury's re-
view. 259 As to earning potential, Gasperini admitted to making
249. See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct 2211, 2216.
250. See Petitioner's Brief at 2, Gasperini (No. 95-719); Respondent's Brief at
1, Gasperini (No. 95-719).
251. A motion in limine is "[any motion, whether used before or during trial,
by which exclusion is sought of anticipated prejudicial evidence." BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 787 (6th ed. 1991).
252. See Respondent's Brief at 2, Gasperini (No. 95-719).
253. See Petitioner's Brief at 3-6, Gasperini (No. 95-719); Respondent's Brief
at 3, Gasperini (No. 95-719).
254. See Petitioner's Brief at 4-5, Gasperini (No. 95-719).
255. See id. at 5; Respondent's Brief at 2, Gasperini (No. 95-719).
256. See Petitioner's Brief at 6, Gasperini (No. 95-719).
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See id. at 2-3.
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only approximately $10,000.00 from photography between the
ten years preceding trial.260 However, he explained that during
that period he was not actively marketing his transparencies
but rather, building his portfolio in Central America. 261 Gasper-
ini testified that he had planned to compile the photos and pub-
lish them in a book on Central America,262 although no evidence
was presented that Gasperini had ever sought or obtained a
publisher. 263
In assessing damages, the jury was instructed to consider
the "content and subject matter of the lost slides," the photogra-
pher's experience and reputation, and "prior licensing fees col-
lected" by the photographer.26 The jury returned a verdict of
$450,000.00, or $1,500.00 for each slide.265 The Center moved
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) [hereinafter
Federal Rule 59]266 for a new trial on the grounds that certain
evidence was admitted erroneously and that the verdict was ex-
cessive.267 The motion was denied without comment and the
Center appealed. 268
B. The Court of Appeals
On appeal, Judge Calabresi, writing for the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, ruled that the award granted by the jury was
excessive under New York law and directed a new trial unless
Gasperini accepted a $100,000.00 remittitur.269 In reaching
this conclusion, Judge Calabresi applied New York's standard
for reviewing appeals for excessive verdicts embodied in New
York Civil Procedure Law and Rules section 5501(c) [hereinaf-
260. See id. at 3; Respondent's Brief at 4, Gasperini (No. 95-719). Forty per-
cent of the $10,000.00 total fees represent monies from the rental of the instant
photos by Center for Humanities. See Respondent's Brief at 4, Gasperini (No. 95-
719).
261. See Petitioner's Brief at 3, Gasperini (No. 95-719).
262. See id.; Respondent's Brief at 4, Gasperini (No. 95-719).
263. See Respondent's Brief at 4, Gasperini (No. 95-719).
264. See Petitioner's Brief at 7, Gasperini (No. 95-719).
265. See id.; Respondent's Brief at 5, Gasperini (No. 95-719).
266. See supra note 81.
267. See Petitioner's Brief at 7, Gasperini (No. 95-719); Respondent's Brief at
5, Gasperini (No. 95-719).
268. See Petitioner's Brief at 7, Gasperini (No. 95-719).
269. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 66 F.3d 427, 428 (2d Cir.
1995).
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ter C.P.L.R. 5501(c)] "deviates materially" test.270 The sole ra-
tionale provided by the Court in applying New York's standard
was that it was reviewing a diversity case.271 The Court did,
however, note that New York's standard provided less deference
to the jury than the traditional federal standard. 272
On review, the Second Circuit surveyed past jury awards
granted for lost transparencies by New York's Appellate Divi-
sion and discerned three separate questions of fact that must be
addressed at trial when evaluating the value of transparencies:
the existence of an industry standard, the uniqueness of the
subject matter, and the earning level of the photographer. 273
Although recognizing each of these factors as relevant in the
evaluation process, the court denied the Center's sole legal
claim that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear and
to take into consideration evidence of an industry standard.27 4
However, the court did comment that New York's Appellate Di-
vision has ruled that an industry standard could not alone be
used as a valuation gauge. 275 Having so noted, the Court turned
its focus toward re-evaluating the sufficiency of factual evidence
offered by Gasperini on the latter two factors through the prism
of the New York's "deviates materially" standard.27 6
In conducting its review of the facts presented at trial, the
Court claimed to draw "all reasonable inferences in favor of
Gasperini."277 On the factor of uniqueness, the Court found,
based on certain "plausible evidence," the uniqueness of a
number of the transparencies was unquestionable. 278 However,
the Court, conceding that a photographer's own "skill, judgment
and perspective" added to a photo's uniqueness, ruled that with-
270. See id. at 430.
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See Gasperini, 66 F.3d at 428-439. In defining the industry standard fac-
tor, the Gasperini court noted that such can be gleaned from various New York
decisions. See id. See generally Allen MacWeeney, Inc. v. Squire Assocs., 176
A.D.2d 217, 218, 574 N.Y.S.2d 340, 341 (1st Dep't 1991), leave to appeal denied, 82
N.Y.2d 651, 619 N.E.2d 659, 601 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1993) (declares that uniqueness
and earning level must be considered).
274. See Gasperini, 66 F.3d at 429.
275. See id. at 428.
276. See id. at 429-31.
277. Id. at 431.
278. See id.
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out the benefit of viewing either the actual transparencies or a
video of them, a reasonable jury could not find all 300 of the
transparencies worth $1,500.00 each. 279 The Court determined
that only fifty photos warranted the jury's $1,500.00 award. 2 0
Addressing the factor of the earning level of the photogra-
pher, the Court ruled that since photography had only gener-
ated $10,000.00 for Gasperini in the preceding 10 years, there
was insufficient evidence of an earning level to support the ver-
dict.28 ' After discounting the evidence of potential profits from
a photo book Gasperini planned to publish because no evidence
was offered that a publisher was or would be found to publish
the work, the Court found that no evidence was offered that he
would earn additional income from photography.28 2 In sum-
mary, the Court stated that Gasperini "failed to make a show-
ing on either . . . [uniqueness or earning level] ... sufficient to
sustain the jury's verdict."283
Ironically, the Second Circuit noted that it was within the
jury's authority, rather than their own, to set the specific level
of awards.28 4 Further, it noted that its ability to accurately
weigh awards was difficult because it dealt solely with a "cold
paper record," of which the court lacked factual knowledge, and
could only be compared to other cases. 28 5 However, the Court
claimed it was its responsibility to "patrol the outer bounds" of
what may be deemed reasonable compensation. 28 6 In so patrol-
ling, the Second Circuit upheld the $1,500.00 award for each of
the fifty photos it thought were unique, and without noting its
own valuation process, set the value of the remaining photos at
$100.00.287
C. The Supreme Court Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify the correct
standard federal courts should employ when reviewing a denial
279. See Gasperini, 66 F.3d at 429-31.
280. See id. at 431.
281. See id. at 429.
282. See id.
283. Id.
284. See Gasperini, 66 F.2d at 431.
285. See id.
286. See id. at 431.
287. See id.
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of a new trial motion for jury verdict excessiveness in a state-
created cause of action.288 Posed with this issue, the Court rec-
ognized that a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction over
a state-created action must act as an alternative state court,
and thus must rely on state substantive law to rule on state
rights.289 Accordingly, the Court ruled that the state law stan-
dards of review, here New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules
section 5501(c), should be applied in federal district courts sit-
ting in diversity when deciding whether a jury verdict was ex-
cessive. 290 The Court's main support for its decision stemmed
from the forecast that if the state standards of review were not
applied, substantial deviations in the size of monetary awards
between state and federal courts "may be expected."291 Thus,
the Court declared that the outcome-determinative test re-
quired the application of New York law on that point of law.292
Furthermore, the Court held that an appellate court could re-
view a district court's ruling under an "abuse of discretion"
standard. 29 3
Addressing New York Civil Practice Law and Rules section
5501(c), the Court noted that this "deviates materially" stan-
dard, which provided less deference to jury verdicts than New
York's prior "shocks the conscience" standard, arose from a
movement of state tort reform. 294 In application, the determina-
tion of whether an award "deviates materially" from reasonable
compensation required appellate courts to compare the instant
jury award to prior approved awards in similar cases.295 As
such, the majority noted that C.P.L.R. 5501(c) does not provide
a statutory limit on allowable damages for particular injuries
which, the majority admitted, would have been considered sub-
stantive law under the Erie doctrine. 296 Rather, C.P.L.R.
5501(c) provides a procedural instruction which allocated deci-
288. See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2217.
289. See id. at 2219.
290. See id. at 2215.
291. Id. at 2221.
292. See id.
293. See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2215.
294. See id. at 2218. For explanation behind the adoption of New York's new
standard of review, see supra note 98.
295. See id. at 2218.
296. See id. at 2220.
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sion-making authority to the appellate courts regarding dam-
ages.297 However, the state's purpose in enacting the stricter
C.P.L.R. 5501(c) standard was to control verdict awards, mak-
ing "the State's objective manifestly substantive."298 Since the
standard is substantive in nature, the majority declared that
the Erie doctrine required that the state standard be applied. 299
In deciding which level of the federal judicial system should
apply this standard of review, the Court noted that the New
York Legislature originally intended the standard to be applied
by the state's appellate divisions.300 However, the majority
noted that New York state case law, since the adoption of the
"deviates materially" standard, applied the standard to trial
courts.30 ' Justice Ginsberg declared that this trend of applica-
tion to "the trial level [was the] key to this case."30 2 Federal
trial courts would have to apply the New York standard; how-
ever, application by a federal appellate court would alter the
character of the federal judicial system and violate the con-
straints of the Seventh Amendment Re-examination Clause.30 3
It was those constraints that rendered the Second Circuit's ap-
plication of C.P.L.R. 5501(c), in the instant case, violative of the
essential character of the federal system derived from the Sev-
enth Amendment. 30 4
The Court noted that the power to review jury verdicts and
grant new trial motions for verdict excessiveness was histori-
cally the sole province of the district court. 305 The federal dis-
trict courts were capable of effectively "performing the checking
function" of New York's "deviates materially" standard of re-
view. 306 Furthermore, since trial courts dealt with cases first
hand while appellate courts were limited to cold paper records,
297. See id. at 2219.
298. Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2220. The Court noted that the standard is at
the same time both substantive, in that it "controls how much a plaintiff can be
awarded," and procedural, in that it "assigns decision making authority to New
York's Appellate Division." Id. at 2219.
299. See id. at 2221.
300. See id. at 2218.
301. See id.
302. Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2218.
303. See id. at 2221.
304. See id. at 2221-22.
305. See id. at 2222.
306. See id. at 2224.
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such allocation of review to the former seemed to be the most
practical.307
Having affirmed the federal district courts authority to
grant or deny motions for new trial motions for excessiveness of
a verdict, the Court considered whether federal courts of ap-
peals could review those trial court rulings. 308 The Court noted
that the exercise of that power by courts of appeals was a "rela-
tively late, and less secure development," than the historical
right of the district courts to grant new trials.30 9 Further, the
Court noted that this appellate exercise of power had histori-
cally been viewed as a Seventh Amendment violation.310 How-
ever, the Court stated that such review was necessary to insure
the "fair administration of justice."311
Although great deference was accorded to the district
courts when they ruled on a motion for a new trial on the
grounds of an excessive verdict, the majority noted that there is
an outer limit where appellate court intervention and review is
warranted.312 Beyond that outer limit, an excess is transformed
from a question of fact to a question of law.3 1 3 Supported by
such reasoning and the fact that all federal circuits have al-
ready engaged in such review, the Court declared that appellate
review on the aforementioned motions was valid and not viola-
tive of the Seventh Amendment. 314 However, to accurately re-
flect the deference due to the district courts, the abuse of
discretion standard should be employed during such review. 31 5
The Court noted that the District Court failed to address
the issue sufficiently to satisfy the "deviates materially" analy-
sis.316 Thus, the majority vacated the judgment rendered by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the
District Court.31 7 On remand, the District Court must review
307. See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2225.
308. See id. at 2223-24.
309. See id. at 2222-23.
310. See id. at 2223.
311. Id.
312. See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2223 (citing with approval Dagnello v. Long
Island R.R. Co., 289 F.2d 797, 806 (1961)).
313. See id. at 2223 (citing with approval Dagnello, 289 F.2d at 806).
314. See id. at 2223-24.
315. See id. at 2225.
316. See id.
317. See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2225.
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the verdict in light of the requirements of the "deviates materi-
ally" standard.318
D. The Dissents
1. Justice Stevens
In his dissent, Justice Stevens agreed with the majority's
Erie analysis, as well as its finding that federal appellate
courts, sitting in diversity, are not inhibited by the Seventh
Amendment to review excessiveness of jury verdicts. 19 As to
the former, he declared that since there was "no conceivable
conflict between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59" and New
York's "deviates materially" standard, the Erie doctrine was the
appropriate analysis to apply.320 In applying the doctrine, Jus-
tice Stevens noted that state procedure does not control in fed-
eral courts.321 However, when a legal maximum award
recoverable is set by the state legislature in a particular action
that maximum award controls in federal court.322 Here, Justice
Stevens noted that New York's practice of limiting awards by
requiring a comparison of the instant award to similar past
cases, pursuant to C.P.L.R. 5501(c), was no less substantive for
Erie analysis purposes than a statutorily imposed damages
cap.
3 23
As to whether appellate courts could review district courts
new trial motion determinations on new trial motions for jury
verdict excessiveness, Justice Stevens stated that a verdict may
be so excessive as to "be insupportable as a matter of law."324
Such is the case if an award exceeds a statutory recovery cap.325
Since New York's standard sets a recovery limit but ties that
limit to a factual comparison of the instant case to other cases,
the resulting issue for review becomes a hybrid law-fact ques-
tion.326 Appellate review of this mixed legal-fact question would
be valid as long as the reviewing court resolves "all record infer-
318. See id.
319. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
320. See id. at 2226 n.1.
321. See id. at 2226.
322. See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2225-26.
323. See id.
324. Id. at 2227 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
325. See id.
326. See id.
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ences in favor of the fact-finder's decision."327 In so doing, the
appellate court would not be re-examining facts but would
rather be isolating the excessive legal portion.328
Additionally, Justice Stevens found that there was no va-
lidity to the argument that the Seventh Amendment precludes
either the district courts or the appellate courts from ruling on
jury verdicts.329 Explaining the structure of English common
law courts, Justice Stevens wrote that the en banc courts sitting
at Westminster were appellate courts because the nisi prius
judge did not always serve on the en banc court.330 Since the en
banc courts reviewed the excessiveness of verdicts, Justice Ste-
vens validated the present appellate review since the Seventh
Amendment made exception to the re-examination of a jury ver-
dict where similar re-examination was practiced in courts at
common law.331
However, Justice Stevens dissented with the majority's
conclusion that the Seventh Amendment mandates that the ap-
pellate courts apply an abuse of discretion standard when re-
viewing the District Court's application of the "deviates
materially" test. 332 According to Stevens, there remains a need
to extend deference to trial courts when motions deal with
"legal, yet fact-intensive, questions."333 However, given the ma-
jority's contention that the "deviates materially" standard de-
fines a substantive award limit, the assignment of a different
standard to the appellate courts "undermine[s] the conclusion
that the Re-examination Clause is relevant to this case."334 The
majority erred in not applying the state "deviates materially"
standard to the federal courts of appeals.335
Justice Stevens also dissented in the ultimate disposition of
the case.336 There was, in his opinion, no reason to remand the
case to the District Court since the Second Circuit had already
327. Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2227.
328. See id.
329. See id. at 2229 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
330. See id. at 2228.
331. See id. at 2227-28.
332. See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2229.
333. Id. at 2230.
334. Id. at 2229 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
335. See id. at 2229-30.
336. See id. at 2230.
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conducted a correct analysis in light of the "deviates materially"
standard.337 As such, Justice Stevens would have affirmed the
Court of Appeal's ruling.338
2. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas
Justice Scalia vehemently attacked the majority's ruling as
an unfortunate deviation from traditional American federal ju-
risprudence and a complete disregard for the Constitutional
right to a jury trial.339 By extending authority to the appellate
courts to review jury awards for excessiveness, the majority ef-
fectively ruled that the Seventh Amendment's second clause
had "outlived its usefulness." 340 Justice Scalia further remon-
strated the majority for its radical constitutional abandonment
which was supported not by sound legal analysis, but by the
simple fact that the federal circuit courts have chosen to ignore
legal history. 341
Turning first to review New York's Civil Practice Law and
Rules section 5501(c), Justice Scalia articulated the necessary
two step approach to its application: 1) the determination of a
range of awards that would be reasonable, and 2) "whether the
particular jury award deviates materially from that range."342
The task of determining the range of reasonable compensation
necessarily demanded a factual re-examination of the appealed
issue of the jury set damages amount. 343 Justice Scalia opined
that such a practice, which entailed readdressing an issue tried
by a jury, was an inappropriate and unconstitutional exercise
for the federal appellate courts.344
According to the dissent, a reflection on history revealed
that the Seventh Amendment's Re-examination Clause was
adopted to ensure that federal courts are barred from re-exam-
ining factual issues tried and resolved by a jury, except for mat-
337. See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2226.
338. See id.
339. See id. at 2230 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
340. Id.
341. See id.
342. Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2230 (quoting Consorti v. Armstrong World In-
dus., Inc., 72 F.3d 1003, 1113 (1995)).
343. See id. at 2230-31.
344. See id. at 2231 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ters traditionally allowed at common law. 345 At common law,
trial courts were authorized to grant new trials when a jury ver-
dict was against the weight of the evidence. 346 Appellate re-
view, however, was authorized only via writs of error, which
could only contain questions of legal error.347
In support of the bar on appellate review, Scalia traced the
history of English common law at the time the Seventh Amend-
ment was adopted.3 48 After a nisi prius trial, motions for a new
trial were made to the en banc court prior to the entry of judg-
ment.349 However, he noted that any characterization of the en
banc court as an appellate court was both erroneous and func-
tionally misplaced.350 The dissent maintained that a survey of
cases, at the time, illustrated that new trials were not granted
unless the nisi prius judge who presided over the trial certified
such action.351 Scalia insisted that it was only after such mo-
tions were ruled on and judgment was entered that the ability
to appeal on writ of error arose.352 As such, the en banc court
hearing new trial motions on grounds of jury verdict excessive-
ness acted as a trial court.353
Addressing the issue of excessiveness, the dissent asserted
that the issue of the appropriate level of damages to award is a
factual question. 354 Additionally, Justice Scalia found that both
challenges to excessive jury set awards and motions for new tri-
als based on such excessiveness pose solely factual questions for
review. 355 Having determined that these issues "necessarily
pose[d] a factual question," Justice Scalia declared that such re-
view by federal appellate courts of appeals was in contravention
with the re-examination prohibition of the Seventh Amend-
ment.356 Furthermore, he stated that any attempt to character-
ize the excessiveness of a verdict as a legal question, or to
345. See id. at 2231-32.
346. See id.
347. See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2231-32.
348. See id. at 2233.
349. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
350. See id. at 2233-34.
351. See id. at 2234 n.5 (referring to Weisbrod, supra note 155, at 92).
352. See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2234.
353. See id. at 2233-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
354. See id. at 2231.
355. See id. at 2230-31.
356. See id. at 2232.
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equate the review of such as the application of a legal standard
avoids the simple fact that either situation would require an un-
constitutional factual re-examination. 357
Having asserted that factual review for excessiveness
should be exercised solely by the trial courts, Justice Scalia con-
ceded that appellate review in instances of trial court error may
in fact result in a more just judicial system.358 However, Justice
Scalia noted that a more just system did not render federal ap-
pellate review any less unconstitutional. 359 Since federal appel-
late review is barred by the Seventh Amendment, any further
debate concerning the standard to be applied at the appellate
level in reviewing a trial court's ruling on a new trial motion for
excessive jury verdicts is pointless. 360 Even an extremely defer-
ential appellate standard of review cannot change a factual
question to a legal matter on which an appellate court could
constitutionally comment.361 A review based upon the "abuse of
discretion" standard, which the majority assigned to the federal
appellate courts, still requires an impermissible re-examination
of the facts of the case. 362
Dissenting from -the majority's application of New York's
Civil Practice Law and Rules section 5501(c) standard of review
for assessing jury verdicts in federal court, Justice Scalia articu-
lated what he saw as four separate but intertwined flaws in the
majority's choice of law analysis. 363 The composite result of
these flaws was the authorized upset of the allocation of func-
tions in the structure of the federal judicial system.364
First, Justice Scalia echoed the historical view of the Court
that the review of jury awards in federal court was a matter
controlled by federal law.365 Although state law provides factors
which the jury should consider in setting the award, it was fed-
eral law that controls matters relating to "the proper review of
the jury award by a federal district court and courts of ap-
357. See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2236.
358. See id. at 2231 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
359. See id. at 2231.
360. See id. at 2236.
361. See id.
362. See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2236.
363. See id. at 2236-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
364. See id. at 2236.
365. See id. at 2236-37.
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peal."366 By altering the federal district court's role as sole com-
mentator on the verdict excessiveness issue and the appropriate
standard to be applied to it, the majority ran counter to the fed-
eral policy articulated in Byrd of not disrupting the judge-jury
relationship. 36 7
Second, Scalia opined in dissent that the majority's charac-
terization of New York's standard as substantive for purposes of
Erie analysis was flawed, declaring that the majority's analogy
between C.P.L.R. 5501(c) and a statutory cap "fail[ed] ut-
terly."368 Scalia explained that there exists a clear and funda-
mental difference between a rule of law (e.g., a statutory cap)
and a rule of review (e.g., C.P.L.R. 5501(c)). 369 The latter, un-
like the nature of substantive law, exemplifies the effort to en-
sure that the law is adhered to but it does not change the
underlying law itself.370
Third, Scalia maintained that the majority, in ruling that
C.P.L.R. 5501(c) was substantive, misconstrued the Erie analy-
sis by solely considering the outcome-determinative test.371 The
majority erroneously disregarded the Byrd Court's spin on Erie
that balanced appropriate countervailing considerations; here,
the considerations that were allegedly disregarded included the
federal right to a jury trial and the applicable standards of re-
view of jury awards.37 2 Notwithstanding that the majority's as-
sertions are derived from the fundamentals of the Erie test,
Scalia discounted the majority's reliance on the potential for dif-
fering outcomes in federal and state courts in the same case.373
In light of the district courts' power to grant new trials where
the jury award is excessive according to the federal standard,
Scalia characterized the majority's reliance on the future poten-
tial for substantial deviation in awards as unfounded.37 4 As
such, by adopting the state standard of review, the majority ex-
366. Id. at 2237 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Dispo-
sal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 278-79 (1989)).
367. See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2237 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
368. Id. at 2238 (Justice Scalia makes clear that a statutorily established
maximum would be characterized as substantive under the Erie doctrine).
369. See id.
370. See id.
371. See id. at 2238 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
372. See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2238-39.
373. See id. at 2238.
374. See id. at 2238-39.
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changed the potential for consistently divergent outcomes (the
occurrence of which was highly questionable to begin with),
with the destruction of the uniformity of federal practice.37 5
Justice Scalia's final condemnation of the majority's appli-
cation of state law is derived from the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.3 76 Since the standard applied in addressing motions
for a new trial is designated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59 [hereinafter Federal Rule 59], the dissent declared that the
majority's defective analysis rendered the Erie doctrine imma-
terial.37 7 Federal Rule 59 states that a "new trial may be
granted . . . for any of the reasons for which new trials have
heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the
United States."378 As the last five words suggest, through refer-
ence to federal courts, the articulated standard to be applied
must be federal in nature.379 Thus, since Rule 59 is sufficiently
broad to conflict with state law on the issue of the standard ap-
plicable to new trial motions, such federal rule must govern.380
3. On Remand to the District Court
Revisiting its initial decision on remand, after being va-
cated by the Supreme Court, Judge Brieant first addressed the
Erie doctrine issue.381 Noting that the Supreme Court's analy-
sis was not so much an extension of the doctrine as a return to
the older strict outcome-determinative test of Guaranty Trust,
Judge Brieant set about applying the New York standard of re-
view.382 Such an application required the court to review "what
[the] trial court considered, namely the actual facts of [the]
case." 38 3 Determining that the Second Circuit approach to New
York's standard was to decrease the jury award to the maxi-
mum level which would not be seen as excessive, the district
court set the maximum award at $375,000.00, contingent upon
375. See id.
376. See id. at 2239 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
377. See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2239.
378. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 59).
379. See id. at 2239.
380. See id.
381. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 765 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
382. See id. at 767.
383. Id. at 769.
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the acceptance of a $75,000.00 remittitur against the original
$450,000.00 award.38 4
In brief treatment of the Seventh Amendment issue, Judge
Brieant noted that the District Court had initially viewed the
award level set by the trial jury as high.3 85 However, the
Center's new trial motion was denied because the District Court
did not want to interfere with an award set by a jury.38 6 The
source of hesitancy in upsetting the jury award arose from the
"mystique of the Seventh Amendment." 387 However, since the
Supreme Court has now validated the use of less deferential
state reView standards, Judge Brieant warned against the po-
tential negative effects on trial administration and case settle-
ment if federal trial judges were to begin to act too freely in
modifying jury verdicts. 388
V. Analysis
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities exemplifies and contin-
ues a line of case law which has gradually devalued the rights
and protections provided by the Seventh Amendment. 3 9 The
means employed by the majority to accomplish this constitu-
tional contravention is initially supplied by its incomplete Erie
doctrine analysis. The end product of the Court's Erie analysis
is that federal courts, sitting in diversity, are to employ a state
standard of review when reviewing trial court orders denying
new trial motions on grounds of jury award excessiveness. 390
The unavoidable consequence of this ruling is that the deferen-
tial protection given to factual jury determinations by the Sev-
enth Amendment's Re-examination Clause391 is supplanted
with potentially fifty different state review standards, each pro-
viding as much or as little jury deference as each state sees fit.
384. See id. at 768, 773.
385. See id. at 772.
386. See Gasperini, 972 F. Supp. at 722.
387. Id.
388. See id. at n.3.
389. Justice Black once commented that there has been a "gradual process of
judicial erosion which in one-hundred-fifty years has slowly worn away . .. the
essential guarantee[s] of the Seventh Amendment." Galloway v. United States,
319 U.S. 372, 397 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting).
390. See supra text accompanying notes 290-92.
391. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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This consequence as well as the need to conduct a full Erie
analysis could have been avoided given the fact that the issue
on appeal was the denial of a new trial motion. 392 As Justice
Scalia explained in his dissent, Federal Rule 59,393 which pro-
vides the guidelines for making and reviewing such a motion,
should have been referred to as the appropriate law to follow. 394
Pursuant to Hanna, when there is a Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure on point with the issue before the court, the federal judici-
ary system is constrained to apply that federal rule.395 The
language of Federal Rule 59 instructs a court, reviewing a mo-
tion for a new trial, to apply a federal standard of review.396 In
light of the fact that Federal Rule 59 had been adopted as the
ruling authority on motions for damages awards, 397 the majority
erred in not applying the federal standard required by the rule.
However, the majority did not comply with Federal Rule 59,
but rather conducted its own Erie analysis. Generally, when
deciphering which elements of state law are to govern in federal
diversity litigation, the Erie doctrine instructs that a dividing
line should be drawn along a procedural and substantive line,
with federal law providing the former and state law providing
the latter.398 Although the line is not easily drawn between the
two, 399 if the application of some aspect of state law, in place of
the analogous federal law, would substantially impact the out-
come of a litigation 400 or result in a different outcome,40 1 such
aspect would likely be termed substantive.40 2 Acknowledging
that New York's review standard40 3 was formulated to act as a
control on damage awards,40 4 the Gasperini majority's initial
approach to the choice of law issue mirrored traditional Erie
analysis by concentrating on the potential for differing litiga-
392. See supra text accompanying note 76-78, 97, 376-380.
393. See supra note 97.
394. See supra notes 97, 376-380 and accompanying text.
395. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
396. See supra text accompanying notes 97, 379-80.
397. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
398. See supra text accompanying notes 26, 73.
399. See supra text accompanying note 74.
400. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
401. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29, 50-53, 75.
402. See supra text accompanying notes 26-30, 39.
403. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
404. See supra text accompanying notes 294-98.
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tion outcomes resulting from the application of a state stan-
dard.405 However, the Gasperini majority also noted that New
York's standard embodies aspects of procedure that "would be
out of sync with the federal system. '406
Thereafter, the majority stepped beyond, or away from, the
traditional Erie test by investigating New York's purpose be-
hind adopting its present standard of review40 7 and subse-
quently ruling that the state's intent to restrict jury awards
rendered the standard substantive in nature.408 This hybrid
twist to Erie's traditional procedural/substantive distinction
consequently blurred the line between the law that provides the
procedures to obtain recovery and that which embodies the
right to recovery. 40 9 Nevertheless, by the operation of this hy-
brid approach, the majority validated state law application, 410
thus dismissing the prior view that a standard of review in the
federal system was a matter controlled by federal law.4 1 '
What should not be overlooked is the majority's misguided
treatment of New York's review standard as a statutory cap on
damages.41 2 Both the majority and Justice Scalia concede that
an award cap set by state law would be substantive for Erie pur-
poses,413 however, that view fails to comport with C.P.L.R.
5501(c).o Rather, C.P.L.R. 5501(c) supplies a non-static appel-
late mechanism which provides the means to control the size of
jury awards; 414 that is, a "soft cap on damages."415 Any resul-
tant limits which germinate from the application of that stan-
405. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29, 289-92. Justice Scalia, in his
Gasperini dissent, questioned the majority's claim that there existed an actual po-
tential for differing outcomes, noting as support the fact that federal district court
trial judges have the authority to weigh the sufficiency of the evidence in relation
to the jury's award. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 116 S. Ct 2211,
2238-39 (1996) (Scalia,, J., dissenting).
406. Gasperini, 116 S.Ct at 2219; supra text accompanying notes 297, 303-04.
407. See supra text accompanying notes 294-98. See also Gasperini v. Center
for Humanities, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 765, 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
408. See supra text accompanying notes 298-99.
409. See supra text accompanying notes 35-39.
410. See supra text accompanying notes 299.
411. See supra text accompanying notes 80-83, 94-98, 365-66, 369-70..
412. See supra text accompanying notes 368-370.
413. See supra text accompanying notes 296, 368-70.
414. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
415. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., No. 95-719, 1996 WL 191793,
at *17 (Apr. 16, 1996) (Official Transcript of Oral Argument).
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dard by state courts should be adhered to by federal courts416 so
as to avoid the possibility of divergent outcomes. 417 However,
where a federal court utilizes the mechanism itself, the benefit
of a cognizable state court limit is replaced by the adoption of a
standard which operates merely to compromise the deference
extended to jury awards by the Re-examination Clause.
After concluding that the application of New York's stan-
dard would affect the litigation's outcome 418 and that the stan-
dard was substantive in nature,41 9 the Court ended its
analysis. 420 Therein lies the majority's major analytical mis-
step, in that a complete Erie doctrine analysis requires that the
concerns which accompany the outcome-determinative test
must be weighed together with a balancing of competing federal
and state interests in having their law apply.42' However, the
state's interest in controlling damage awards was not weighed
against the federal interest of federal court compliance with the
Re-examination Clause's bar on appellate review of jury fact de-
terminations. Rather, the majority considered the Seventh
Amendment prohibition only after it completed its Erie analy-
sis, at which point it reassigned the application of C.P.L.R.
5501(c) appellate review standard to the federal district court so
as not to offend the Amendment.422 This judicially fashioned as-
similation leaves the impression that if the weight of the Sev-
enth Amendment, previously held to be a dispositive federal
interest in an Erie balancing, 423 was of such a degree as to re-
quire the Court to effectively rewrite New York's standard, it
should have at least warranted consideration during the Court's
Erie analysis.
Unfortunately, the majority does not conclude the opinion
with its Erie analysis. Rather, it continues by explicitly ex-
tending to federal appellate courts the authority to review dis-
trict court denials of new trial motions for verdict
416. See supra text accompanying notes 23, 80, 87.
417. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53, 27-29, 75.
418. See supra text accompanying notes 291-92.
419. See supra text accompanying notes 298-99.
420. See supra text accompanying notes 288-99.
421. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
422. See supra text accompanying notes 300-04.
423. See supra text accompanying notes 57-60, 64.
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excessiveness. 424 Although acknowledging that such review has
been historically viewed as violative of the Seventh Amend-
ment 425 and that the exercise of such review by Courts of Ap-
peals is a fairly recent phenomenon,4 26 the majority agreed with
the Second Circuit's rationale that this type of review is neces-
sary to ensure adequate control of awards and "fair administra-
tion of justice."427
If the federal judicial system was devoid of any review of
jury verdicts, the majority's claim that fairness required appel-
late review of jury awards could arguably be valid. However, as
pointed out by Justice Scalia, the district court judges were al-
ready providing such review. 428 The Gasperini majority itself
conceded that the federal "district court[s] [were] capable of per-
forming the checking function" of reviewing jury awards for ex-
cessiveness.429 As such, the conclusion that additional appellate
review of trial judges' decisions was required to insure that effi-
cient and accurate review was served, does not necessarily
follow.
The prohibition on the appellate review of damage award
excessiveness is derived, via the Seventh Amendment's Re-ex-
amination Clause, from common law.430 Pursuant to English
common law practice, 431 the review of a jury determined award
for excessiveness, which was seen as a factual issue,43 2 could
only be conducted by a trial court.4 33 Although there could be
appellate examination of trial determinations on a writ of er-
ror,4 34 this review was limited to errors of law, such as improper
jury instructions. 435 It is this tradition of review that provided
the impetus for 43 6 and was secured by the Seventh Amend-
424. See supra text accompanying notes 311-15.
425. See supra text accompanying notes 310.
426. See supra text accompanying notes 309.
427. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2211, 2223.
428. See supra text accompanying notes 367, 374.
429. Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2224.
430. See supra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
431. See supra notes 135-70 and accompanying text.
432. See supra text accompanying notes 164-66.
433. See supra text accompanying notes 152-56, 165-66.
434. See supra text accompanying notes 161-70.
435. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
436. See supra text accompanying notes 114, 121, 126.
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ment.437 Thus, by authorizing appellate review of jury award
excessiveness, the Gasperini court violated the common law
practice embodied in the Seventh Amendment.
In reference to this common law, the Supreme Court, as
early as 1830, declared that facts could be re-examined only by
means of a new trial motion when granted "by the court where
the issue was tried or which the record was properly returna-
ble."438 This rule, which has been repeatedly reaffirmed,439 ex-
empts federal appellate court comment on new trial motions.
There has been some commentary to the effect that the en banc
court in Westminister was in fact an appellate court reviewing
nisi prius judgments and thus the Seventh Amendment is not
violated when courts of appeals rule on denial of such motions
since the practice existed at common law.440 However, this is a
mischaracterization of the English judicial structure, since the
nisi prius judges were merely an extension of the en banc
court,4 41 which was a trial level court." 2 It is this structure that
is adopted into the federal system and should have acted to bar
federal appellate review of jury award excessiveness. 443 Unfor-
tunately, the Gasperini majority chose to deviate from this pro-
hibition, thus departing from a long Supreme Court record of
adherence to it.444
Although this constitutional prohibition extended to the
courts of appeals,4 45 the courts of appeals had already begun to
engage in such review.446 The Gasperini majority noted that
each circuit has agreed that the review of trial court orders de-
nying new trial motions based upon jury award excessiveness
was authorized where the size of an award exceeds a level that
is so great as to render the award a reviewable question of
437. See supra text accompanying notes 127-33.
438. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 448 (1830).
439. See supra note 180.
440. See supra notes 221, 330 and accompanying text.
441. See supra text accompanying notes 142-51.
442. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., No. 95-719, 1996 WL
191793, at *31 (Apr. 16, 1996) (Official Transcript of Oral Argument). See also
supra text accompanying note 159.
443. See supra notes 171-74, 192-95 and accompanying text.
444. See supra text accompanying notes 171.
445. See Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934). See also supra note 188 and
accompanying text.
446. See supra notes 219-27, 309, 314 and accompanying text.
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law.44 7 By adopting such a rationale to validate its authoriza-
tion of appellate review, 448 the majority dismissed a line of rea-
soning developed by the Supreme Court that once an issue is
classified as a question of fact, it is not converted to a question
of law simply by operation of the appeal process.44 9 Where a
particular issue has been characterized as a factual question,
the appellate review of such necessitates a violative referral
back to the facts on which it was based.450 This blatant factual
review has historically been held violative of the Seventh
Amendment, irrespective of whether the District Court properly
reviewed the award or not.45 1 Only when a case could be made
that the trial judge failed in his duty to consider the new trial
motion at all was there an exception to the rule that review of
new trial motions was within the complete discretion of the trial
judge and outside the realm of.appellate court power. 452
In a confusing turn of logic, after declaring that federal ap-
pellate courts could review trial court denials of new trial mo-
tions on the ground of verdict excessiveness, the Gasperini
majority stated that New York's standard of review, which the
majority had earlier noted was to be applied in state appellate
courts, could not be applied by federal appellate courts.453
Moreover, the majority stated that if the federal appellate
courts were allowed to employ that standard, the essential char-
acter of the federal judiciary structure would be altered.454 En-
deavoring to explain the allocation of the state appellate
standard to federal trial courts, and not to federal appellate
courts, the majority first claimed that practicality dictated such
an allocation.4 55 Since the trial judge dealt with the case first
447. See supra text accompanying notes 312-14.
448. See supra text accompanying notes 311-314.
449. See supra note 186 and accompanying notes text.
450. See supra text accompanying notes 242, 343-44. See also Arkansas Val-
ley Land and Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69, 74 (1889) (When presented with a
new trial motion on grounds of excessiveness, "[tihe court necessarily determines,
in its own mind, whether a verdict for a given amount would be ... excessive.");
Narin v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 837 F.2d 565, 567 (1988).
451. See supra text accompanying note 190-95, 204-207, 209-212.
452. See Miller v. Maryland Casualty Co., 40 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1930) (citing
Mattox v. U.S., 146 U.S. 140 (1892).
453. See supra text accompanying notes 302-08.
454. See supra text accompanying notes 303-04.
455. See supra text accompanying notes 306-07.
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hand, it was only practical to have the trial judge determine
whether the award "deviated materially" from reasonable com-
pensation.456 However, this logic seems to cut against the
Court's assertion that it was necessary to have appellate courts
review district courts on the issue of the excessiveness of a jury
award. If the trial judge had a better opportunity to weigh the
evidence against New York's standard,457 granting the author-
ity to courts of appeals to conduct a subsequent review would
seem more likely to frustrate, rather than foster, the fair ad-
ministration of justice.
In further support of its allocation of the New York stan-
dard to the district court, the Gasperini majority stated the
state standard could not be applied "by federal appellate courts
without violating the Seventh Amendment's re-examination
clause."45 However, the majority had also declared, for the first
time, that federal appellate courts could review the factual is-
sue of verdict excessiveness without violating the Seventh
Amendment. 459 Given this validation, how then could the appli-
cation of a state standard by federal appellate courts be viola-
tive of the Amendment? It would seem that the Re-examination
Clause's bar on federal appellate review has been reduced to a
question of the degree of deference accorded a jury finding by a
particular standard of review. That is, if the appellate standard
is "abuse of discretion," then the Seventh Amendment is not vio-
lated; however if the standard is less deferential, as is the "ma-
terially deviates" standard, there is a constitutional violation.
As noted by Justice Stevens, the majority's reference to the Sev-
enth Amendment undermined their analysis.460
In summary, the majority declared that an appellate court
could review a ruling by a district court, which had applied a
state standard of review, on the excessiveness of a jury verdict,
without violating the Seventh Amendment's bar on the re-ex-
amination of facts found by the jury. However, that same fed-
eral appellate court could not engage in the same review
without violating the Seventh Amendment. This creates con-
456. See supra text accompanying note 307.
457. See supra text accompanying notes 206-07.
458. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, 116 S. Ct 2211, 2219 (1996).
459. See supra text accompanying notes 308-11.
460. See supra text accompanying notes 332-35.
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siderable confusion. Whereas before Gasperini, federal trial
courts reviewed new trial motions for excessiveness pursuant to
Federal Rule 59's deferential standard of "shocks the con-
science,"461 and federal appellate courts lacked any statutory or
judicially validated reviewing power,462 Gasperini opened the
door for a less deferential state standard to be applied by dis-
trict courts and inserted the "abuse of discretion" standard at
the appellate level.463 This is not a very comforting trend from a
Seventh Amendment viewpoint. The majority's twisted maze of
illogical reasoning took one further turn when the majority
noted that when reviewing trial court orders, a "federal [appel-
late] court must be guided by the damage-control standard state
law supplie[d]."464
Assuming the majority was warranted in absorbing New
York's standard into the federal system, its decision to fashion a
rule whereby state standards were to be applied by district
courts was not without its flaws. The majority failed to take
into consideration, in establishing this rule, that some state
standards may not accommodate the confines and constraints of
the Seventh Amendment. As noted in Gasperini, the trend in
New York state courts extending its standard of review, origi-
nally fashioned for New York appellate courts, to the state's
trial courts was instrumental in allowing the standard to be as-
similated into the federal system.465 Because of such applica-
tion at the state trial level, the majority was able to incorporate
the state standard into the federal judicial system without a
constitutional snag.466 However, the question of how federal
courts were to apply state law that did not conform to the Sev-
enth Amendment constraints is left unanswered. Furthermore,
even if state law conformed with the Seventh Amendment, the
possibility of having a different standard for each state casts a
dark shadow upon conformity within the federal judicial
system.
461. See supra text accompanying notes 87, 98.
462. See supra notes 171-95 and accompanying text.
463. See supra text accompanying notes 288-93.
464. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2211, 2225 (1996).
465. See supra text accompanying notes 301-02.
466. See supra text accompanying notes 303-04.
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In the end, the majority clarified that the appellate court
was to review the district court's "deviates materially" review
pursuant to an "abuse of discretion" standard.467 The adoption
of this appellate standard was to afford the district court some
degree of discretion.46 However, even with the adoption of this
highly deferential legal standard, the fact remains that applica-
tion of this standard requires the federal courts of appeals to
engage in re-examination of the facts underlying an award
found by a jury.469 It is this inescapable fact that renders the
Re-examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment inoperative.
VI. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities, Inc.470 marked an inauspicious move for the Court.
Although the Court is not restrained from overruling past deci-
sions, such action must find its foundation in concrete, logical
reasoning. The need for sound analysis becomes paramount
when the matter revolves around the direct interpretation of
the Constitution. Here, the Court forged new constitutional
ground, contrary to an interpretive tradition that dates back to
the adoption of the Constitution.471 As such, the highlights of
the Court's analysis are that present day conceptions of fairness
and the modern circuit courts' practice warrants appellate re-
view in certain circumstances. 472 Such support falls danger-
ously short of that which should be embraced before
overturning long-standing constitutional tradition.
An unfortunate consequence emanating from the Court's
authorization of appellate review is an indirect grant of creative
interpretive powers to the courts of appeals. That is, the
Supreme Court has set a precedent that the courts of appeals
can abandon traditional federal practice, engage in conduct pre-
viously held unconstitutional and have their new practice up-
held. Here, the fact that a constitutional amendment was
rendered outdated doctrine gives the impression that nothing is
467. See supra text accompanying notes 314-15.
468. See supra text accompanying note 315.
469. See supra text accompanying notes 242, 181-187.
470. 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996).
471. See supra notes 107-26, 171-74 and accompanying text.
472. See supra text accompanying notes 312-14, 341.
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taboo. In the final analysis, it seems that circuit court discre-
tion has been expanded considerably, to the detriment of both
the Seventh Amendment and the Supreme Court.
Joseph B. Koczko*
* This article is dedicated to my grandparents, Andrew and Elizabeth Koczko.
I would also like to express my appreciation to my family and Jessica Busby for all
their support and encouragement over the last three years.
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